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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is composed of the results of our investigation in quantum cryp-
tography - a new topic in computer security. The goal of this study is to explore 
useful schemes for quantum cryptographic communications. 
The focus of our study is an investigation into quantum cryptographic proto-
cols based on quantum-mechanical uncertainty principle and Bell's inequality. 
First, we use the theory of quadrature phase amplitudes and quantum homodyne 
detection to establish a new quantum key distribution protocol which relies on 
an optical coupler. In this work we propose, for the first time, the use of this 
theory in quantum cryptography. Second, we investigate Ekert's protocol using 
Bell's theorem. The contents in this investigation is not new, but we use our 
calculation to prove that Ekert's protocol is true for both photon-based and spin-
|-particle-bcised systems. Third, we study a quantum coherence key distribution 
constructed using Bennett and Brassard's protocol. The information theory of 
the system is used to study the scenario where eavesdropping occurs. Finally, we 
explore the theory of quantum nondemolition detection (QND) to investigate the 
results when eavesdropping occurs. A calculation for the QND, using parametric 
frequency conversion, is given for two different quantum cryptographic systems. 
Our study is undertaken with the aid of some knowledge of physics, therefore, 
before our main results are presented, we introduce some useful physics which 
may help readers understand the contents of our work. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
In conventional cryptography and information theory it is taken for granted that 
digital communications can always be passively monitored, and that an eaves-
dropper learns the entire contents of a communication, without the sender or 
receiver being aware that any eavesdropping has taken place. Quantum cryptog-
raphy enables two people to exchange messages with perfect security unattainable 
by conventional cryptography. The central idea behind quantum cryptography is 
that an eavesdropper cannot monitor transmission without being noticed by the 
participants. 
Since quantum cryptography was invented 15 years ago, approximate 80 research 
papers have been published in journals and conference proceedings worldwide. 
This research has yielded some interesting protocols, mainly based on Heisen-
berg's uncertainty principle and quantum correlation. Our study is devoted to 
some interesting quantum cryptographic protocols in optical communications. 
The aim of this chapter is to review previous studies in quantum cryptography 
and to introduce our work. 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 HISTORICAL REVIEW OF QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY 
Quantum cryptography was born in the late 1960s when Stephen Wiesner wrote 
"Conjugate Coding" [1]. Unfortunately, his paper was not published. Charles 
H. Bennett and Gilles Brassard were the first people to recognize the importance 
of Wiesner's idea and brought quantum cryptography to life. The first paper 
on quantum cryptography, written by C.H. Bennett, G. Brassard, S. Breidbart, 
and S. Wiesner, W£LS published in 1983.[2] Subsequently, Wiesner's original paper 
was published in Sigact News [1]. At present, about 80 relevant papers have 
been published. A valuable summary of these papers (up to 1993) is given in the 
bibliography by Brcissard [3]. 
Exploitation of quantum effects in cryptographic communications can yield sig-
nificant and novel benefits not anticipated by clcissical physics. Quantum cryp-
tography is bcised upon quantum medianical phenomena, such as Heisenberg's 
uncertainty principle and quantum correlation. The latter is represented by the 
famous EPR or Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedankenexperiment [4, 5]. A 
well-known protocol using the uncertainty principle was proposed by Bennett, 
Brassard and co-workers in [6, 2]. This protocol is now called BB protocol. The 
BB protocol shows that information can be encoded in one of four nonorthogonal 
quantum states (based on photon polarization) using two bases in such a way 
that any attempt to extract the information by an eavesdropper will random-
ize and hence destroy the information. In other words, the eavesdropper's acts 
will definitely cause a change in the signal between the legitimate users, there-
fore revealing the presence of the eavesdropper. On the other hand, it has also 
been demonstrated that the EPR and Bell's theorem or inequality [7] is useful in 
quantum cryptography. Protocols bcised on the EPR and Bell's theorem exploit 
the properties of quantum-correlated particles. As eavesdropping unavoidably 
introduces some local condition caused by the mecisurement, it causes the data 
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measured by legitimate users to display no violation of Bell's inequality and then 
reveals the attempt of interception [8]. A further simplified protocol which does 
not use Bell's inequality has been proposed by Bennett, Brassard, and Mermin [9]. 
Although there are some other interesting protocols, for instance, based on pho-
ton interferometry[10], teleporting [11], rejected-data [12], and so on, the BB 
protocol and Ekert's protocol [13] are the most important models in quantum 
cryptography. 
The BB protocol employs Wiesner's original idea using the Heisenberg's un-
certainty principle. Detailed references for this protocol can be obtained from 
Ref.[6, 2, 1, 14, 15]. We will also give more details about the BB protocol in next 
chapter. Here we only briefly introduce this protocol. The BB protocol is con-
structed using four polarized photon states which belong to two bases, basis-one 
and basis-two, with two states for each basis. The measuring operator based on 
basis-one can precisely measure the states in basis-one only; if we use it to mea-
sure the states in basis-two, the outcome will be totally random, and vice versa 
for the measuring operator based on bcisis-two. In the BB protocol, a sender (say 
Alice) sends a sequence of polarized single photons, which are randomly chosen 
from the four polarized photon states, to a receiver (say Bob) who randomly and 
independently chooses a measuring basis to measure each photon. After complet-
ing all the measurements. Bob announces publicly which basis has been used for 
each photon (but not the results of the measurements). Alice and Bob discard 
the results in which Bob failed to detect a photon and those for which the mea-
surements were made using a polarization basis different from the one used by 
Alice. The remaining results are checked by comparing a large subset of these 
remaining results. If they agree, the remaining results not yet revealed can be 
used as a key, so achieving a quantum key distribution. If an eavesdropper (say 
Eve) tries to read the quantum channel, she will not be able to measure the signal 
correctly due to the lack of basis information. Hence, Eve, attempting to use the 
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
intercept/resend, cannot reconstruct the signal sent by Alice, if she wants to use 
the way of intercept/resend. This is because her measurement (if she randomly 
chooses the measuring basis) yields random results only. If she resends all pho-
tons generated using the result of her measurements, it will still cause substantial 
errors in the measurements made by Bob. Although Alice will announce publicly 
which basis is correct for each of Bob's mecisurement after the communication 
has been completed, it is too late for Eve since each of her mecisurements had 
been carried out before Bob's measurement was performed. 
The BB protocol relies on the two non-commuting bases. Using states in only 
one of the bases, we are unable to obtain any useful protocol via the BB-type 
idea. Using a totally different idea, Ekert [13] proposed a new type of quantum 
cryptographic system which could be built by modifying the apparatus that Alain 
Aspect and coworkers [5, 16] used to test Bell's inequality. In Ekert's system, a 
source placed between Alice and Bob emitting spin-| particles in a singlet state. 
These particles are basically correlated electron pairs (or they can use a two-
photon state as an alternative). One particle in the singlet state is sent to Alice 
and the other to Bob. Alice and Bob set their analyzers to an orientation which 
is randomly and independently chosen from one of the specified orientations, for 
instance, horizontal, vertical, or diagonal, and measures the spin of incoming par-
ticle. After the whole signal string has been transmitted, Alice and Bob announce 
publicly which orientation was used for each singlet state. Using Bell's theorem, 
consequently, Ekert can guarantee the security of those instances measured when 
both Alice and Bob use the same orientation, these instance can thus be used as 
a secret key. 
It seems that Ekert's system is automatically secure, since the particles contains 
no information until the measurements are performed by Alice and Bob. However 
Eve might try to circumvent the system by substituting her own choice of particle 
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states in place of those from Alice and Bob's source. However this will fail because 
she does not know the orientations that Alice and Bob will choose for their 
analyzers. Her intervention would be equivalent to the introduction of elements 
of physical reality or local condition, thus the correlation function will not have 
the correct quantum-mechanical value. 
Ekert arranged his data analysis in such a way that Alice and Bob partition the 
outcome of the mecisurements into two groups: group-one contains the instances 
where they have both used the same orientation; group-two contains those where 
they have used different orientations. Using group-two, Alice and Bob calculate 
the correlation of the measurements. If they find the outcome of the calculation 
agrees with Bell's inequality, they can assume that there must be some sort of 
eavesdropping that happened during their communication. Otherwise, if the out-
come violates Bell's inequality, the correlation must be prefect and the instances 
in group-one are usable by them as a secret key. 
Bennett et al. [9] suggested that the EPR-type system can be constructed without 
using Bell's inequality. Their scheme is bcisically equivalent to their original 
protocol which requires the uncertainty principle. 
Bennett [10] also proposed a system using only two quantum states, instead of 
the four in the previous model. Alice can start the key distribution protocol by 
sending Bob a sequence of binary states, batsed on two nonorthogonal quantum 
states, to denote 0 and 1 respectively. Bob has two filters that select states 
orthogonal to the state corresponding to 0 and the state corresponding to 1 
respectively (we define them as filter-0 and filter-1). Filter-0 annihilates state 
1, but yields a positive result for state 0, and vice versa for filter-1. After the 
quantum transmission. Bob tells Alice publicly which meiisurement had a positive 
result, but does not say which filter was used. Alice and Bob then discard all 
instances that do not show a positive result and keep those which are perfectly 
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correlated as a secret key. Eve does not know in advance which choice Alice and 
Bob have made in the transmission, so if she could make an apparatus similar to 
Bob's, she still would not be able to use the appropriate filter. This will make 
her measurements induce substantial errors into the signal, and thus reveals her 
attempt at eavesdropping. 
Barnett and Phoenix have proposed a quantum cryptographic protocol using 
three quantum states [12, 17], called it rejected-data protocols. The key point in 
this protocol is that the analysis of the data obtained, when Alice and Bob used 
different orientation in their analyzers, can provide useful information regard-
ing whether or not any eavesdropping hcis occurred. The protocol is somewhat 
analogous to the Ekert's protocol using Bell's theorem. Hence they were able to 
construct Bell-type correlation using the three photon states and demonstrated 
a connection between their result and the protocol using the Bell inequality. 
As we noted, security in a quantum cryptographic system is based on the quantum-
mechanical principles, such as the uncertainty principle and Bell's theorem. All 
known quantum cryptographic systems are based on single-particle states, such 
as a single photon state or a single electron state. In practice, one uses very dim 
light with intensity less than one on the average (i.e., for instance, sometimes 
receive zero photon and sometimes receive one photon). Otherwise quantum 
cryptographic systems would encounter a beam-splitting attack. Fortunately, 
current photoelectric technology is adequate for making a single-photon state 
and transmitting it to a distant destination (such as 30 km [18]). 
However, a recent development in quantum optics provides us with a light mea-
surement scheme, which presents a promise for measuring a light signal without 
damaging the signal. This scheme is quantum nondemolition detection (QND). 
In QND mecisurement the signal is not physically measured, instead, a probe 
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mode which is interacted with the signal mode is measured by a detector. After 
interaction, the probe light may contain full information of the signal. 
Is it bad news for quantum cryptography? We hope not. Werner and Milburn 
19] have obtained a negative result, when they used a method involving photon-
number QND measurements to eavesdrop a Bell-type system. They showed that 
eavesdropping causes a violation of quantum-mechanical principle under a QND 
measurement. We will, in this thesis, give some detailed studies about the QND 
which will be introduced in later part of this chapter. 
A great interest in experimental realization of quantum cryptographic commu-
nication hcis recently been seen. Experiments carried out include those for the 
BB protocol [6, 20], the EPR-type system [8], and single photon interference[21]. 
The first experimental demonstration of the BB protocol was done by Bennett et 
al. [6], in their experiment, using a hashing technique, a very low error rate was 
achieved. In the latest experiment, Muller and coworkers [20] have also success-
fully demonstrated the BB protocol. They were able to use an optical fibre over 
more than 1 km and achieved a very low error rate. Also, according to a recent 
paper [18], Marand and Townsend have achieved quantum key transmission using 
a 30 km long optical fibre interferometer. 
1.2 TOPICS STUDIED IN THIS THESIS 
Our attempt in this thesis is to investigate quantum cryptographic protocols. 
Our study extensively involves fundamental physics knowledge, but it should 
be suited for readers who have a little background knowledge in physics and a 
good background in cryptography. Our interests are in these particular areas: 
protocols using quadrature phase amplitudes of a light field, protocols based 
on Bell-type inequalities (is basically Ekert's protocol, but via our calculation), 
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protocols for conference key distribution, and quantum nondemolition detection 
against quantum cryptographic systems. 
In the first work, we develop a quantum cryptosystem which allows a crypto-
graphic key bit to be encoded using four nonorthogonal quantum states described 
by non-commuting quadrature phase amplitudes of a weak optical field (but not 
photon polarization!). Our system is secure, since the nonorthogonal states are 
designed to have a large multi-overlap, hence it is impossible to obtain a certain 
result when performing a measurement on one of these states. The realization of 
this protocol relies on an ordinary photon-coupling apparatus which allows cryp-
tographic signal to couple with squeezed light. Such coupling scheme provides a 
secret shared key for the legitimate users involved. 
Ekert's protocol is the first protocol based on Bell's inequality. In this thesis, we 
re-study it using both photon-based and spin-|-particle-based models. Under our 
calculation, it is shown that Bell's inequality is satisfied in by both the photon-
based and the spin-|-particle-based systems when eavesdropping takes place. We 
should state that our calculation result is not new. 
Multi-user key distribution is called conference key distribution. A classical con-
ference key protocol was studied by Ingemarsson, Tang, and Wong [22]. However, 
a quantum channel is different in that it is a closed-single-line channel and so only 
communication between two users is allowable, while a classical channel can be 
allowed to extract information by multiusers. An open question is whether we 
can have a multi-user quantum cryptographic system. In this work, we study 
conference key distribution protocols based on the BB protocol. The system 
information theory and correlation are studied for two basic conference key dis-
tribution systems: fan-shaped and series configuration. It is however noted that 
there are some practical problems on the implementation of conference key pro-
tocols we have proposed. These problems include security (for one Fan-shaped 
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configuration) and quantization. Some of problems are fundamental and are un-
solvable, whereas we should include the contents which at least demonstrate the 
flaws. 
The security of a quantum cryptographic channel can be undermined by the 
activities of an eavesdropper who can perform meaisurements on fields as they 
travel from the sender to the receiver. Suppose that the possibility of a beam-
splitting attack hcis been eliminated by use of faint particle beams, then Eve's 
strategy might turn to using methods which involve more advanced physics, such 
as the QND technique. Our investigation will focus on the QND schemes using 
parametric frequency conversion [23]. We will demonstrate that for a private 
quantum channel, the QND scheme will also be restricted by the uncertainty in 
the detection process, whereas an encrypted signal may be in principle conserved 
(but in practice suffers some losses). 
The contents of this work are organized as follows, In Chapter 2 we review some 
fundamental physical concepts which are useful for quantum cryptography. We 
mainly address the questions, such as, ''What is quantum physics?" "What are 
the properties of particle-wave?" "What is the uncertainty principle?" "What are 
the EPR paradox and Bell's theorem?" etc.. This information will help readers 
to understand quantum cryptography and our work. 
Chapter 3 is devoted to protocols based on uncertainty principle. The main 
purpose in this chapter is to investigate one novel protocol using quadrature phase 
amplitudes of light, especially, where an optical coupler is employed to realize the 
protocol. The BB protocol will also be introduced to enable comparison before 
proceeding to the investigation of our protocols. Part of the contents in this 
section has been published in Optics Communication [24]. 
In Chapter 4, we study Ekert's protocol based on Bell's theorem. 
1 0 CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 5 studies the protocols of quantum cryptographic conference key distri-
bution and the information theory of a system where eavesdropping hcis occurred. 
Our goal is to investigate how the BB protocol will perform if multi-users require a 
common key distribution. Part of the contents in this chapter has been published 
in the Conference Proceeding of ISIT (1994). [25 
In Chapter 6, we investigate an eavesdropping strategy based on the QND mea-
surement. Bennett's system [10] and our system studied in Chapter 3 will be 
investigated. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion. 
2 
CRYPTO GRAPHICALLY USEFUL 
FUNDAMENTAL QUANTUM PRINCIPLES 
Quantum theory is the basic theory which precisely describes microscopic physics. 
It is generally realized that quantum theory represents a radical change, not only 
in the content of scientific knowledge, but also to the fundamental concepts in the 
terms with which such knowledge can be expressed. Nowadays, quantum theory 
has been extensively applied in science. One surprising application of quantum 
theory is in the field of secure communications. The fundamental theories which 
guarantee the security are the uncertainty principle of quantum medianics and 
correlations of quantized particles. The purpose of this chapter is to introduce 
some important quantum concepts which are directly relevant to quantum cryp-
tography. 
2.1 ESTABLISHMENT OF QUANTUM PHYSICS 
To understand the bcisic principles of quantum mechanics, we need some historical 
background knowledge of quantum mechanics. In the 17th century Newton and 
several other great scientists developed a successful theory to explain motion 
of objects. This theory is called clcissical mechanics. Newton's explanation of 
motion in terms of forces, momentum and acceleration is encapsulated in his three 
laws of motion, which successfully describe the motion of macroscopic bodies, 
such as cars, planets etc.. Perhaps the most successful application of Newton's 
11 
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theory is the exploration of space. Generally, nowadays, the usefulness of classical 
mechanics for sending a space shuttle to the moon is assumed. 
In the period of the late of the 19th century and the beginning of 20th century, 
Newton's classical mechanics was generally regarded as having been completely 
developed, however it also encountered serious problems, particularly at the very 
small distance involved in the study of atoms and molecules. 
Historically, quantum theory began with the attempt to interpret the equilibrium 
distribution of electromagnetic radiation from a blackbody. In the 1800's, rapid 
developments in the metallurgy of high temperatures pushed forward the study 
of heat radiation. In the late 19th century, it was realized that heat radiation 
is a kind of electromagnetic radiation. This gave the impetus to intensive stud-
ies in electromagnetic radiation in both theory and experiment, especially for 
blackbody radiation. Difficulties using classical mechanics were encountered due 
to the disagreement between the experiment results and predictions of classical 
mechanics. In Fig. 2.1, the spectral distribution of the energy density as a func-
tion of frequency is plotted as evidence of the disagreement. For low frequencies, 
the spectrum actually does agree with classical physics, but for high frequencies, 
classical physics predicts a monotonic increase in the energy density, whereas the 
energy density distribution decreases toward zero. 
A physicist, Planck, was able to make a clever guess at an empirical formula 
representing the energy distribution spectrum, but he wcis unable to provide a 
theoretical derivation of the formula with the context of classical physics. Late 
he found that his empirical formula could be derived by use of a hypothesis of 
quantization of energy. He adopted a simple model for the walls of the cavity. 
The walls consist of a large number of electrically charged harmonic oscillators 
of all possible frequencies. The oscillators exchange energy with the radiation in 
the cavity. He stated that for a frequency v of an electromagnetic radiation, any 
CHAPTER 2 CRYPTOGRAPHICALLY USEFUL FUNDAMENTAL QUANTUM PRINCIPLES 13 
3 
•FC-
W 
w c (D T3 >% 
<D 
C (D 
LÜ 
-0 
Figure 2.1 Spectral distribution of the energy density E as a. function of frequency 
for the thermal radiation in a cavity. The solid line plots the result of an experiment 
and the dashed line plots the result of the classical prediction. 
substance absorbs and emits it by a unit of hi/^ where h is a. universal constant of 
proportionality, later called Planck's constant. In the other words, an absorption 
or emission must be performed by way of quantization. Planck postulated that 
the energy of an oscillator of frequency i/ could only be 
E = nhu n = 0,1,2,3, . . . (2.1) 
Although Planck treated the wall as quantized oscillators, he treated the field in 
the cavity as completely smooth and continuous, as in the classical electromag-
netic theory. 
Einstein is the first person who quantized electromagnetic fields and predicted 
that the quantization of energy hypothesis could solve other problems of classi-
cal physics. The most famous application is photoelectric effect. Measurements 
showed that when light strikes the surface of a metal, electrons, or photoelec-
trons are ejected, depending on the frequency, but not the intensity of light. 
This contradicts classical electromagnetic theory, which predicted that the en-
ergy available in the light is proportional to the intensity and is independent of 
its frequency. In 1905, Einstein applied Planck's hypothesis to solve the questions 
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posed by the photoelectric effect and assumed that the energy of a photon is hv. 
When the frequency (or energy) of a photon that strikes the surface of a metal 
is large enough, an electron can be knocked out of the metal. According to Ein-
stein's theory, ultra-violet photons have more energy than visible-light ones, and 
so no matter how much visible light you shine on the metal, none of the photons 
have enough energy to emit an electron. 
Other important questions of the early of 20th century, such as atomic spectrum, 
stability of atom, etc., were solved in rapid succession. Nowadays, there is no 
doubt that quantum mechanics can precisely describe the atomic world. 
2.2 WAVE AND PARTICLE PROPERTY 
In classical mechanics a particle is a pointlike mass. Such a classical particle has 
well defined position. The motion of the particle proceeds along a well defined 
trajectory. However, quantum particles behave very differently. 
We now explain the behaviour of quantized particles. In the famous Young's 
interference experiment using double slits, it was demonstrated that light behaved 
as a water wave with respect to interference. It might be inferred that light is more 
wave like than particle like. However, photons were later discovered. In the 19th 
century physicists found that electrons appeared to follow definite trajectories 
in cathode-ray tubes. They therefore concluded that electrons were particles. 
However, later, a similar experiment using electrons showed a similar interference 
pattern to that of light. This cannot be explained by classical theory. Indeed, 
electrons, unlike bullets that are pure particles and can be described using using 
classical theory, travel like waves! The discovery of the particle properties of light 
and the discovery of interference and diffraction effects of electrons demolished 
this tidy distinction between particles and waves. 
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The early quantum theory ways were sought to supplement classical theory with 
quantization conditions. In 1920's, physicists finally recognized that it would not 
work without abandoning classical theory. De Broglie took the first step forward 
and predicted that electrons and other particles have wave properties. De Broglie 
postulated that the frequency of the wave associated with a particle is related to 
the energy of the particle by the same equation as for the light wave associated 
with a photon: 
v = E/h. (2.2) 
He then deduced that the wavelength of the wave must be related to the momen-
tum of the particle: 
A = h/p. (2.3) 
Thus, for the wave cissociated with a particle moving in the x direction, he pro-
posed the harmonic wavefunction: 
27r 
V» = sin 27r(i/i - x/X) = sin -j^iEt - px). (2.4) 
This theory was not widely accepted until confirmed by later detailed experiments 
of electron diffraction with thin films of metals. 
We must conclude that electrons and photons show wave-like interference in their 
arrival pattern despite the fact they are particles. In this sense we can say that 
quantum objects sometimes behave like waves and sometimes behave like parti-
cles. We cannot explain the magic of quantum mechanics. All we can do is to 
describe the way quantum things behave. This description is quantum mechanics. 
2.3 HEISENBERG'S UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE 
We have seen that quantum mechanics does not allow us to visualize the motion 
of the quantum particle properly due to the properties of wave-particles. This in 
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fcLct implies the uncertainty of quantum mecisurement. Heisenberg first recognized 
this properties and predicted that, since the quantum-mechanical particles have 
wave property, they cannot have sharply defined position and velocity, or position 
and momentum. In the other words, new quantum laws imply a fundamental 
limitation to the accuracy of experimental measurement. This is the essence of 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle can be written down in a precise mathematical 
form. We now focus on the position and momentum of a quantum-mechanical 
particle only. Physicists usually talk about momentum meaning the mass of 
the particle multiplied by its velocity, rather than about velocity. It is familiar 
that a car's speed (hence momentum) can be precisely measured at a certain 
position on a highway. However the measurement of the position and momentum 
of a quantum-mechanical particle must obey a limitation given by Heisenberg's 
uncertainty inequality 
A X A P > (2 .5) 
where K = /i/27r, x denotes the position of the particle and p denotes the mo-
mentum of the particle. Ax and Ap represent the uncertainties. Heisenberg's 
inequality suggests that it is impossible to mecisure the quantities x and p as 
accurately as we would wish. In the other words, it is impossible to make both 
Ax and Ap small, since the product of the uncertainties must always be equal 
to or greater than a constant Speaking more explicitly, if the position is 
accurately measured, the momentum will be totally random or uncertain, and 
vice verse. 
Planck's constant may be obtained from experiments of the photoelectric effect. 
The value of Planck's constant h is tiny, approximately 6.62 x lO'̂ '̂ Js. Thus, in 
terms of Eq. (2.5), we can understand why a car's position and momentum can 
be coincidently measured with certainty, since the h on the right-hand side of 
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electron 
beam 
Figure 2.2 The ariangement of equipment for an electron diffraction experiment. 
the inequality is now negligible in comparison with the position and momentum. 
However, h is of importance for a quantum-mechanical particle which, roughly 
say, has a size equal to or less than an atom. 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle can be precisely proven by using mathematical 
tools. In general, Heisenberg's uncertainty principle has the form: 
AAAB> | ( [ i ,B]) | /2, (2.6) 
where we have used " to label quantum-mechanical operator, the commutation 
A A A A A A 
relation [A, B] = AB — BA, and (• • •) denoting averaging. For example, xp—px = 
ih, which results in (2.5). Inequality (2.6) suggests that any two non-commuting 
quantum operators cannot accurately and simultaneously be measured. 
Heisenberg illustrated the uncertainty principle with some physical experiments. 
A typical one is electron diffraction. Fig. 2.2. The experiment consists of a 
horizontal slit through which an electron beam is injected and travels toward 
the screen where measurement of the positions of the electrons is performed. If 
an electron passes through the slit, then its vertical position is known within 
an uncertainty Ax = a (the width of the slit). However, because of its wave 
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properties, the electron will suffer diffraction at the slit and spreads up and down 
over a range of angles. Let Q denote the angular width of the central maximum 
of the diffraction pattern. The width is given by the formula: 
asinO = (2.7) 
The vertical component of the momentum has uncertainty given by 
Apx = p sin 6 = Y sin ̂  w hja. (2.8) 
A 
The uncertainty relation in this experimental arrangement then is 
AxApx = ah! a = h, (2.9) 
If we want to measure x more accurately, a must be small. This will cause an 
increase in the uncertainty of px. 
To illustrate the application of the imcertainty principle to quantum cryptogra-
phy, we will give another example of photon polarization measurement in the 
next section. 
2.4 THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE AGAINST 
EAVESDROPPING 
One of features of quantum medianics is the uncertainty in the measurements. 
Heisenberg's uncertainty principle suggests that for two noncommuting observ-
ables, accurately measuring one observable necessarily randomizes the value of 
the other. Now we explain how this uncertainty can be utilized to implement 
security communication. 
Here we focus on photon polarization. A photon can be polarized into the fol-
lowing orientations: horizontal, vertical, left-circular, right-circular, 45® diagonal, 
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Figure 2 .3 Polarized photons pass through a Wollaston prism set at angle 0 ' . 
and 135® diagonal, These orientations belong to three bases: + , Q? x? where 
+ {horizontal, vertical}, 
O —̂  {left-circular, right-circular}, 
X {45® diagonal, 135°diagonal}. 
Observables in two arbitrary bases out of the three do not commute. This implies 
that accurately measuring a observable in one basis will randomize the observables 
in the other basis. 
We illustrate this in Fig. 2.3 (after Ref. [26]). The detector is a Wollaston prism 
whose angle is set at 0° corresponding to basis thus the detector can measure 
photon polarization at either 0® or 90® with certainty. If we do not set the photon 
polarization to 0® or 90®, the result of measurement will be a probabilistic one 
dependent on the angle, because quantum theory tells us that it is impossible to 
determine this value with certainty. In the special Ccises, where we choose the 
angle of photon polarization to be either 45® or 135®, corresponding to basis x, 
the measuring result shows that half of the photons show up on the left with the 
angle of 0® and half of them show up on the right with the angle 90®. We have 
an analogous situation, if we use photons with circular polarizations to replace 
those with rectilinear or diagonal polarizations. 
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The implication of the above analysis is that if we choose photons polarized using 
two eurbitrary b<ises (out of the three) to implement a communication, we might 
have bonus of adding the security to the communication. As we have said, this 
is because any eavesdropping using a wrong basis will randomize the photon 
polarization, and this can be detected by the receiver. A more detailed analysis 
will be given in the next chapter. 
2.5 ENTANGLED STATES 
Since quantum-mechanical pcirticles have the properties of both particles and 
waves, they have to be described by a wavefunction or a quantum state. A 
simple example of a wavefunction is given by equation (2.4). The behavior of a 
wavefunction is determined by the corresponding Schrodinger equation. Here, we 
do not attempt to go into details of Schrodinger equation but intend to explain 
entangled wavefunctions which are directly relevant to the subject of this work. 
How is a quantum measurement performed? Suppose that there is a quantum-
A 
mechanical measuring operator, H, which measures a quantima state (one of 
A 
the eigenstates of In the simplest case, we have, 
Hxl̂ i = (2.10) 
A 
where Ei is the only eigenvalue of the measurement. If ^ is used to measure the 
other state xp2 we obtain the sole eigenvalue E2, 
= (2.11) 
and \l?2 can be used to construct a superposition state 
^ = CiV̂ i + C2̂ I)2- (2.12) 
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Figure 2.4 The arrangement of the beamsplitter which produces entangled states. 
The measurement of ^ using H becomes uncertain and can be only described 
by probabilities. It can merely be predicted that there is a |cip of probability of 
obtaining Ei and a |c2p probability obtaining where |cip + |c2|̂  = 1. 
A physical system may consist of several quantum objects, for example, the outer 
orbit of oxygen consists of two electrons, which can be described by a singlet quan-
tum state - a kind of entangled state. An entangled state cannot be decomposed 
into a product of two states. For example, if ^(xi, X2) is an entangled state, there 
is no way to write it into the form of = The state of an 
oxygen atom may be considered CLS an entangled state of the electrons. 
We focus only on Schmidt-type entangled states (or Schmidt decomposition), 
which are directly relevant to our topic. Suppose now that there are two initial 
states of photons, |a) and which are coupled through a beamsplitter arranged 
as shown in Fig. (2.4). The entangled state for beam 1 and 2 is written as: 
1^) =Ci|a)i|/?)2 + C2|;5)i|a)2. (2.13) 
Obviously, it is impossible to write this wavefunction in a decomposed form. 
Actually, what we can predict for the output light is the probability: there is a 
probability of |cip of finding |a) in beam 1 and in beam 2 and a probability 
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of |c2| of finding in beam 1 and |a) in beam 2, respectively. If we use a 50-50 
beamsplitter, the probabilities in both cases are 
As an entangled state, a coherent superposition of two orthogonal eigenstates is 
also called the Schrodinger cat state or macroscopic superposition state. If we 
assume which state |a} represents a cat which is alive and |/?) represents a cat 
that is dead, equation (2.13) will show the entanglement of both alive and dead 
cats. In a strict interpretation of quantum theory, all quantum states represent 
the probability of occurrence of specific events. A Schrodinger cat state is a 
typical example: if the Schrodinger cat gedankenexperiment is repeated many 
times under the condition of Ci = C2, one half of cats will be found alive and one 
half will be found dead. 
In an atomic system, for example an oxygen atom, the singlet atomic state is an 
entangled singlet state. If a is a positive electron spin state and p is negative 
electron spin state, the singlet atomic state is then 
V- = - /?(l)a(2)]. (2 .14) 
This atomic state is an entimgled state of two electronic spin states. This entan-
gled state is referred to as Schmidt state (Schmidt decomposition), where it is 
required that = 0 and 2(̂ *1/̂ )2 = 0, i.e., a),- and are orthogonal. This 
assumption is useful in our studies, since we require that the states in each basis 
are orthogonal. 
This section enables for us to investigate Bell-type cryptographic systems. 
2.6 EPR NONLOCAL REALISM 
We need the following assumption: if there are two small objects, one here on 
Earth and the other one on Mars, no modification of the properties of the object 
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on Earth will occur due to an interaction of the object on Mars with a third 
body also located on Mars. However, according to Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen 
(EPR), this assumption is false. 
In 1935, Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen developed the theory of so-called local 
realism [27], which raises a fundamental question of quantum mechanics: can 
the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete? 
Their argument is usually called the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen paradox. The 
essence of the paradox is concerned physical reality. They wrote their famous 
reality criterion: If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with 
certainty (i.e., with probability equal to unity) the value of a physical quantity, 
then there exists an element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quan-
tity. 
When a single quantum object is considered, it is impossible to measure its po-
sition X and momentum p simultaneously without substantial errors, using the 
commutation relation [x,p] = h/i (note that for convenience " is ignored). Phys-
ically, when p is measured and a definite value obtained, a previous element of 
reality corresponding to x is destroyed. 
However, according to EPR, things change dramatically, when two correlated 
quantum objects (a and are considered. They were able to show that 
XA - XFI.PA - P^S] = 0 (2 .15) 
and find an entangled wave function 
^ = 8{xa - x p - L)8{pa + p/j), (2.16) 
where L is a large distance beyond the range of mutual interaction of the particles. 
In state we know only the total momentum but nothing about the positions of 
the particles, however if we mecisure x«, then we are able to predict xp without 
measuring it. In terms of the EPR criterion, xp corresponds to physical reality. 
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On the other hand, if we measure p«, we can then obtain the pß with cer-
tainty, without disturbing ß particle. Again, pß corresponds to physical real-
ity. Consequently, we find that our measurement is able to provide the values of 
both position and momentum. This argument contradicts fundamental quantum-
mechanical principles. 
In fctct, the EPR paradox hinges on the examination of the joint quantimi-
mechanical state of two particles that are initially correlated in such perfect way 
that a measurement on one of particles immediately tells us the state of the other 
particle, without any need to measure or disturb the other particle. In 1951, 
Böhm revealed that the EPR can equally well be stated in terms of two pcirticles 
of spin-i in a state of net spin zero, which is a state where the spins of the two 
particles are opposite. 
Consider two particles of spin-|, such as two electrons with opposite spins. Sup-
pose that the particles are initially close together and move to a large distance. 
We then measure the spin of one of the patrticles. Since the total spin is zero, the 
measurement of the spin of the first particle will tell us the spin of the second 
particle which must have the opposite spin. If the spin of the first pzirticle is 
then the second one must Since we did not touch the second particle, the 
state remains the same after the measurement. We may use the same method to 
determine the spin components along x and y directions, and hence all spins can 
be determined without disturbing the second particle. This contradicts quantimi 
mechanics. The crucial step in the EPR argument hinges on the reality criterion 
of particles and on the locality of the measurement procedure. The spin of the 
second particle is supposed to exist in itself, even if it is not measured. In the 
view of EPR, the state vector must be supplemented or replciced be some extra 
"local hidden variables." The spin components mentioned previously must be 
expressed as functions of these hidden variables so that the spin components can 
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be well defined. Using the assumption of hidden variables, it is possible to obtain 
agreement with quantum mechanics. However, in 1965, Bell demonstrated that 
not all of the subtleties of the probabilistic predictions of quantum theory can be 
duplicated by hidden variables [7]. 
2.7 BELL'S THEOREM 
In 1964, John Bell demonstrated that the correlations among spin measurement 
on two particles of spin-i in a state of zero net spin cannot be duplicated by local 
hidden variables. Bell's theory was thought to be the most profound discovery of 
science. 
Now we review Bell's work. Consider a singlet state, given by the equation (2.14). 
Suppose that the spin component of particle a is measured along the direction 
of a unit vector a and the spin component of particle ^ is measured along the 
-t 
direction of a unit vector h. The mecisured observables are 5(a) • a and a(^) - h, 
where 5(a ) and a{l3) are Pauli spin matrices corresponding to the two particles, 
where Pauli spin matrix is defined by 
-t 
a = (7yj + cr^gk, 
and (Tj. = 
The results of the measurements are A and B, respectively, and can have values 
±1. The quantum mechanical correlation coefficient, in the case of the singlet 
state is 
C{a, b) = (V>|(5(a) • a) ® • 6)1̂ -). (2.17) 
It is easy to show that 
C(a, 6) = - a • 6 = - cos 6. (2.18) 
(o n (o - i ) (l 0 \ 
) ^Y = , CTX = 
° J 
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Bell examined this correlation coefficient for measurement of the spin components 
along three directions. He proved that in any local hidden-variable theory the 
correlation coefficient is restricted by an inequality which contradicts quantum 
mechanics. 
—* 
Consider three different directions specified by the unit vectors a, b and c. We 
now perform sequential paired measurements, along the directions a and 6, the 
directions a and c and the directions b and c. The correlations corresponding to 
this sequence of measurements are: C(a, 6), C(a, c), and C(6, c). According to 
local hidden-variable theory, the expectation values of these correlation functions 
are averages over the local hidden variables, with some distribution function. Bell 
proved that in the theory of local hidden variables the correlation coefficients must 
obey the inequality 
Si = \C{a,b) - C ( A , C ) | - C ( 6 , C ) < 1 . ( 2 . 1 9 ) 
Note that this is independent of the details of hidden-variable theory. This result 
is called Bell's inequality and does not conform with quantum mechanics. For 
example, choosing C{a, b) = — cos J, C{a, c) = — cos C(6, c) = - cos J, we have 
Si = y/2 for quantum mechanics (without using the hidden-variable theory). 
A more general form of the inequality due to Clauser et al. is called CHSH in-
equality [28], considers four different directions instead of three. They defined 
the quantity, called Bell's quantity, 
52 = |(7(a, 6) - C(a, 601 + |C(a', 6) -f- C{a', b% (2.20) 
where two orthogonal unit vectors a and a' are associated with the particle a 
and two orthogonal unit vectors b and b' are associated with the particle /?. 
Suppose that their orientations are found by clockwise rotations of x/4 in the 
order a, 6, a', b'. It can be showed that with quantum mechanics, 
5 2 = a-b-a-b -f- a'.ft + a ' . f l = (2.21) 
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F igure 2 . 5 The arrangement of the EPR gedankenexperiment by Aspect et al. 
However using the theory of hidden variables, we can obtain, 
This form of Bell's inequality is commonly used by researchers. 
(2.22) 
Bell's inequality can also be derived for correlation of polarized photon pairs. The 
first EPR gedankenexperiment using polarized photon pairs was based on Bohm's 
theory [4] and was performed ed by Aspect, Granier and Rodger [5]. Their work 
provides a basic model for the first EPR version of quantum cryptography which 
was developed by Ekert [13]. A schematic diagram for the experiment is shown 
in figure 2.5. A source labeled by S generates two-photon states. For each pair of 
photons, after the photons are separated, one photon (say, photon 1) is launched 
towards analyzer 1 and the other one (say, photon 2) is launched towards analyzer 
2 for correlation measurements of their polarizations along arbitrary directions a 
and h. Each measurement can yield either the result 1 (if the polarization is found 
parallel to the measuring vector) or —1 (if the polarization is found perpendicular 
to the measuring vector). 
Suppose P±± denote the probabilities of obtaining the result ± 1 along a (photon 
1) and ± 1 along h (photon 2). The correlation coefficient of the measurements is 
defined by 
C(a, 6) = 6) + P__(a , h) - b) - P . + (a, 6), (2 .23) 
which is the sum of all probabilities for the measurements. Using this correla-
tion coefficient, we can construct Bell's quantity (2.20). Theoretically, under the 
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criterion of the local reality, it should be possible demonstrate Bell's inequality. 
However, like other experiments, the results of their experiment showed a strong 
violation of Bell's inequality. 
In 1991, Ekert, for the first time, applied Bell's theory to quantum cryptography. 
His model is similar to the experiment by Aspect et al.. He believed that eaves-
dropping is equivalent to adding a local hidden variable to the system, hence, in 
principle, nonviolation of Bell's inequality can be used to reveal an attempt at 
eavesdropping. 
3 
CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS BASED 
ON THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE 
When the medium of communication involves quantum-mechanical particles, the 
system naturally obeys quantum-mechanical laws. One important feature of such 
a system is the existence of uncertainty^ which, as we have mentioned in the 
last chapter, is basically due to the wave-particle property. Using quantum-
mechanical particles to carry information, an eavesdropper may be prevented 
from obtaining the information sent by the sender. Bennett and Brassard are 
the researchers who first brought us a practical cryptographic protocol based 
on Heisenberg's uncertainty in quantum mechanics. In this chapter we review 
the BE protocol and investigate a novel model, quantum cryptographic protocols 
using an optical coupler. Our protocol is based on the theory of quadrature phcise 
amplitudes of light. The main result of this protocol has been published in Optics 
Communications. [24 
3.1 BB PROTOCOL 
In the late 1960's, Wiesner had the idea of using uncertainty in cryptography, but 
he did not publish his idea until 1983 [1]. One of his ideas was to use a stream 
of polarized photons to transmit two messages (corresponding to two quantum-
mechanical states). Depending upon the choice of the detectors by the receiver, 
only one message can be readable. Bennett and Brassard, following Wiesner's 
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idea, developed a quantum cryptographic protocol which Wcis published in 1982 
2] (we here call it the BB protocol). Subsequently, Bennett and his co-workers 
successfully built a quantum cryptographic apparatus at the IBM T. J. Watson 
Research Laboratory, USA [6]. 
The BB protocol shows that information can be encoded in one of four nonorthog-
onal quantum states based on two bcises, in such a way, that any attempt to 
extract information by an eavesdropper will randomize, and hence destroy the 
information. 
The quantum cryptographic communication in the BB protocol involves two 
users, say Alice and Bob, who share no secret information, together with an adver-
sary Eve who eavesdrops on their communications. According to the BB protocol, 
there are orthogonal and closed bcises Bi = {\ — | f)} and B2 = {\ Z'), | \ ) } re-
lated to different polarizations: rectilinear and diagonal (or using circular bcisis, 
see Chapter 2). In order to measure these states, we introduce two quantum-
A A 
mechanical operators, Os, and OB ,̂ such that 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
where the eigenvalue /¿o or i/o denotes the binary code "0" and the eigenvalue ¡i\ 
A A r * * 1 / 
or I/I denotes binary code "1". Ob̂  and OBJ ào not commute, i.e. [ 0 T 
This leads to the uncertainty in measurement described by Heisenberg's uncer-
tainty principle 
( A Ô | J ( A Ô | , > > 0 ; (3.3) 
which suggests that a measurement on any state using an incorrect basis will be 
uncertain. The uncertainty can in fact be interpreted from the following. Since 
the states in B\ and B2 are orthonormal and complete, respectively, we have 
0 =Cl| / ' )+C2| \ ) , (3.4) 
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Table 3.1 The BB key distribution protocol for the process of sending/receiving be-
tween Alice and Bob. (1) Alice sends a random sequence of photons polarized along four 
directions based on Bi and B2. (2) Bob measures the photons in a random sequence 
of bases. (3) Bob's measurements are obtained. (4) Bob tells Alice which basis he has 
used for each pulse he received. (5) Alice tells which basis he used was correct. (6) 
Binary information for the key distribution is obtained. 
\) I - ) T) \> I T ) I T ) 
OFL, OB, OB, O B . O B . OB, O B , O B , OB, O B , O B , 
\> T> T> 1 / ) T) 
OB. OB, O B . O B . OB, O B . OB, O B . O B , 
V V V V X / 
1 1 0 0 1 
- ) = C 3 | / ' > + C 4 | \ > , 
/ > = C 5 | ^ ) + C 6 | T), 
\ ) = C 7 | - » ) + C 8 | T), 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
(3.7) 
where c,- are coefficients of the expansions. If we use a wrong operator in a 
measurement, say, OBJI we then have a probability of of obtaining | 
and a probability of |c2|̂  of obtaining | \ ) . It is similar for the other states. 
The BB protocol starts with Alice, who sends a random sequence of all four 
canonical kinds of polarized photons to Bob. Bob randomly and independently 
chooses one of the measuring bases to mecisure each photon pulse. They discuss 
publicly the bases Bob has used and discard those which disagree and keep secret 
the photon polarization outcome. The remaining photons can then be used to 
construct a secret key. Any eavesdropping attempt to extract information will 
irretrievably destroy some information since basis information was unknown to 
Eve before Alice and Bob completed the transmission. Eavesdropping causes a 
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Eve 
D 
Detector 1 
Figure 3 .1 The schematic diagram using multi-beamsplitter in an eavesdropping. 
The beamsplitters are labeled by BS 
change in the information flow between Alice and Bob, and hence reveals the 
presence of the eavesdropper. A more detailed interpretation of the BB protocol 
is shown in Table 3.1. 
If we use photon states which are not pure single photon states, there is the po-
tential for a beamsplitting attack. A light pulse with two photons will possibly 
release all the information to an eavesdropper who uses an appropriate beam-
splitting techniques, for example, a multi-beamsplitter attack. In figure (3.1), 
we proposed such an eavesdropping technique. The main beamsplitter extracts 
a small fraction of the photons (say, two photons), letting the remainder pass 
undisturbed to Bob. Each fraction from the beamsplitter is split (via a 50/50 
beamsplitter) into two beams that are then measured using different bases. Eve 
records each measurement and determines which bcisis is correct only after the 
correct bases are announced publicly. Consequently, Eve obtains the perfect in-
formation she needs without being detected by Alice and Bob. 
In fact, polarization of a multiphoton state in the BB protocol can be detected 
using an approach of dividing/regrouping, without prior knowledge of the mea-
suring basis. The photon pulse sent by Alice can be divided into several fractions. 
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which are then regrouped into two groups, group one and group two. Each group 
contains several small pulses or fractions. We can arbitrarily choose detectors, 
A A A 
either OBI or ôr each group, for example, we use OBI to measure the pulses 
A 
in group one and OB2 to measure the pulses in group two. It is certainly that one 
of detectors is used wrongly. This wrong detector can be readily found, since it 
leads to uncertain results (both 0 and 1). On the other hand, we will see that the 
correct detector gives a sure result. Therefore, the polarization of the extracted 
photon pulse can be accurately determined. 
The BB protocol (and most other quantum protocols) requires single-photon 
states to avoid beamsplitting attacks. However, in practice it is difficult to pro-
duce a light pulse containing only one photon (although it was demonstrated in 
the laboratory [29]). It is much easier to produce a coherent pulse which is a 
superposition of one, two, ... photon states. In order to use currently available 
techniques, we can choose very faint photon pulses so the average photon number, 
(n), is substantially smaller than one, then there is a probability of that 
an eavesdropper will be able to split the pulse into two or more photons. 
3.2 QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY USING FOUR 
NONORTHOGONAL STATES 
3.2.1 Physical background 
Since our protocol appears to be substantially different from that using polarized 
photons, we should explain the relationship between uncertainty and quantum 
measurement. 
For a quantum field mode c, we can write it in the form of c = Ci -f iC2, where 
ci and C2 are quadrature phase amplitudes. The inequality of uncertainty for the 
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Alice Rbre Bob 
Figure 3.2 The schematic diagram of the quantum cryptosystem using an optical 
coupler. Alice's (or sender's) signal generator is labeled by G>i; Bob's (or receiver's) is 
labeled by G s . 
quadrature phase amplitudes is given by 
(Ac?)(AC2) > 1/16. (3.8) 
where (Acf) ((Acj}) denotes the variance of ci (C2). Inequality (3.8) suggests 
that only one of two quadrature phase amplitudes can be accurately determined 
for one measurement. 
For a squeezed state which is a minimum uncertainty state, the equality of (3.8) 
will hold, while the variance of one of the quadrature components is squeezed 
(to zero for a perfect squeezed state) and the variance of the other quadrature 
component is enlarged (to infinity for a perfect squeezed state). For convenience, 
we assume that 6 is a squeezing mode. An ideal squeezed state is evolved from a 
vacuum state |0) by operation with the squeezing operator 
followed by operation with the displacement operator 
i.e., 
\tiufi) = /)(/3)5(f)|0>, (3.9) 
where is the amplitude of mode 6, ^ = rexp(2^), = cosh^ |r|, and = 
sinh^ |r|. r denotes a squeezing parameter. The variances of quadrature phase 
CHAPTER 3 CRYPTOGRAPHIC PROTOCOLS BASED ON THE UNCERTAINTY PRINCIPLE 35 
»w" -«1 
IN- iaz 
Bp- ai 
b^-ibg 
. y 
bg. 1 
(b) 
Figure 3.3 In planes of quadrature-phase amplitudes, (a) shows Alice's encoding 
strategy based on four nonorthogonal coherent states; (b) shows Bob's tap-fibre modes 
using squeezed light. Uncertainty of a state is represented by error ellipses for squeezed 
states and by error circles for coherent states. 
amplitudes can be described by 
(A6?) = (Abl) = (3 .10) 
As showed in figure 3.3 (b), two orthogonal squeezed states are used by Bob as 
his input to the optical coupler. The mode BE = h corresponds to r > > 0, while 
the mode bjsf = ¿62 corresponds to r < < 0. One advantage of using squeezed light 
is that one of quadrature components can be measured with little influence of 
quantum noise. 
The area of ellipse for a mode represents uncertainty (or noise), for instance, we 
can see that, for the squeezed mode bs = ¿i the x component (the projection on x 
axis) is knowable (small noise, ideally zero), but the y component (the projection 
on y axis) is uncertain (large noise, ideally infinity). We can explain the other 
mode similarly. 
For a coherent state, since the photon distribution is Poissonian, the uncertain-
ties for both quadrature-phase amplitudes are equal and the equality in (3.8) also 
holds. Hence both variances of the quadrature phcise amplitudes are 1/4. Ac-
cordingly, in figure 3.3 (a) we can see a noise circle for each coherent state, where 
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we have assumed that mode a represents a coherent state with four encoding ar-
rangements ge = fli, aw = —fli, ûjv = and as = —ia2 (east, west, north, and 
south states). Under our encoding strategy, overlaps among these states should 
be as large as possible, thus it is accordingly cissumed that the overlap between 
the east and west states is approximately 65%, so does the overlap between the 
north and south states. This requires that the mean number of photons for each 
state should be around 0.1. The absolute magnitude of overlap of two coherent 
states can be calculated by 
= (3.11) 
Using this formula, it is easy to find that the overlap between the east and west 
state or the north and south states is 65%, and between the east and north states 
is around 82% (the same for each other pairs of neighbour states). 
When a state is subject to an overlap between two states, it will not be able to 
be determined for sure because it could belong to either of these states. When a 
state is not in the overlap region, it will be possibly determined without mixing 
with other states. Since under our arrangement total area of overlaps in a state 
is more than 90% and a large fraction of area has four overlap layers, it is almost 
impossible to obtain a certain result when performing a measurement on these 
states. 
A homodyne detection is the most sound scheme for performing a measurement on 
a quadrature phase amplitude. The value of measurement is actually equal to the 
projection on the axis of the corresponding detector. We may lock a homodyne 
detector to an orientation, x , — o r —y, which suits the measurements for 
different encodings, cind consistently, we define four detection vectors Vi, VC-x, Vy, 
or VLy, which in fact are four noncommuting projection operators. 
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We first look at a homodyne detection performed on a single coherent state, the 
east state or the north state, and ignore the superposition for a while. In order to 
measure the ea^t state, the homodyne detector must be locked at x direction (i.e., 
using Vx). This is because it has the largest probability of obtaining the correct 
result - a value of the mean (ai), despite the uncertainty (AaJ) =1/4. When 
utilizing the same projection operator K to detect the north state, we will then 
be unable to obtain a correct value, but have a high probability of obtaining zero 
(the uncertainty also equals 1/4). On the other hand, if a state does not have any 
projection on the detection vector, the state will not be able to be determined. 
For example, using Vi, we cannot determine the west state, since it does not have 
any useful projection on Vx (except the projection due to noise). It is concluded 
that for obtaining a correct detection the detection vector must be set accordingly 
to the direction of the signal state. 
Since we are using four nonorthogonal states and each state has a large area of 
overlap with other states, it is hardly possible to correctly determine one out of 
these states by use of a homodyne detector. This feature presents a promise for 
us to apply these states to cryptography. 
As shown in figure 3.2, on the receiving side, we employ an optical coupler which 
consists of two optical fibres. Alice's signal mode is expressed by a creation oper-
ator a^ or an annihilation operator a. Bob's mode in the tap fibre is represented 
by a creation operator b^ or an annihilation operator b. For an optical coupler 
with coupling constant /c, the quantum fields after the coupling obey [30 
A' = ( 1 - + ( 3 . 1 2 ) 
b' = + ( 1 - ( 3 . 1 3 ) 
where 0 < K ; < 1 . /C = 0 corresponds to no signal having been exchanged between 
the fibres, while /c = 1 corresponds to a complete signal having been exchanged 
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between the fibres. The corresponding field quadrature operators are 
ai = {a-\- a^)/2, aj = (a - (3.14) 
= (6 + 6t)/2, b2 = {b- b^)/2L (3.15) 
The explicit expression for quadrature components for coupled states can be 
obtained in terms of Equations (3.12)-(3.15). After coupling the mean number of 
photons at port one is given by 
(a'ta') = (1 - /c)(ata) + K{bh) + ^(1 - «)/c({atfe) + (b^a)), (3.16) 
and at port two is given by 
(b'h') = «(ata) + (1 - K)(bh) - y/(l - K)K{{ah) + (¿^a)), (3.17) 
3.2.2 Shared cryptographic bits 
The basic intention is to establish a common key between two parties, Alice 
and Bob, who share no secret information at the beginning of the cryptographic 
communication. The optical coupler is controlled by Bob who can independently 
choose his own squeezed input source for it. Both signal generators are controlled 
by a time base that guarantees a perfect photon coupling. The output signal is 
detected using two homodyne detectors, one for each port. Also, importantly, in 
order to realize a perfect coupling, Alice and Bob also need to choose a phase 
reference before their communication starts. This can be done by Alice sending a 
sequence of bright reference pulses to Bob and publicly announcing their phase. 
Alice's generator produces faint coherent light, on the average, 0.1 photon per 
pulse, i.e., (a^a) = 0.1. As we have mentioned, under this assumption the total 
overlap on a state is over 90%. The probability a signal pulse contains one or 
more photon is approximately 10%. This figure suggests that 90% of the total 
pulses are vacuum states. Note that it is possible to employ weaker signal light 
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Tab le 3.2 The results of the photon coupling. The illustration is based on a quadra^ 
ture plane. We have assumed equal intensity for both mode a and mode b, the symbol 
"x" represents "discarded", C represents "Canceled", E represents "Enhanced", and a 
sign, character or binary figure in front of "/" has a higher probability of appearance. In 
other words, those in front of "/" are correct; those behind "/" are associated with the 
overlap on the corresponding opposite state. The later ones can be corrected eventually. 
Alice Bob Coupling Result 
Mecisurement Final 
Result Vector Status Result 
as 
bE [ ( + / - ) a i + 6 1 ] K E / C 0 / 1 0 
% C / E 
bN a' = + ibi] K Uncertain X 
b' = + ¿62] K Uncertain 
aw 
bE K C / E 1 / 0 1 
V = + 6.] K E / C 
6jv [ ( - / + ) a i + ¿62] Vy Uncertain X 
Vy Uncertain 
O-N 
bE [61 + { + / - ) i a 2 ] K Uncertain X 
14 Uncertain 
bN E / C 0/1 0 
:(+/-)<i2 - i^] Vy C / E 
as 
bE K Uncertain X 
b' = + ( + / - ) i a 2 ] Uncertain 
bN [ ( + / - ) a 2 - 62 j Vy C / E 1/0 1 
= + H Vy E / C 
such that the superposition of the four nonorthogonal states can be even larger, 
however we do not intend to do that, since our «issumption is sufficient for our 
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cryptographic protocol. Bob's squeezed light is much brighter and has on the 
average one photon per pulse. 
Our quantum cryptographic key distribution protocol is described as follows: 
1: Assuming that a,- is randomly selected from four quantum states a = {as, 
aw, a^^as}, Alice constructs a vector A = (ai,«2» •••jOtn), where a,- G a = 
{aE, CLWt o-Ni ^5}. o. is public information, while A is private data only known 
by Alice. 
2: Bob independently chooses a vector B = of ^ random states, 
/3i £ b = {bs, b]^}. b is public information, but B is private data only known 
by Bob. 
3: Alice sends a. ai £ A to Bob, while Bob injects a which interacts with a,-
in Bob's optical coupler. The coupling result is shown in Table 3.2. In terms 
of the subsequent detection. 
Bob sets /3'i = < 
0 (a bright flash at Port 1 and nothing at Port 2), 
1 (a bright flash at Port 2 and nothing at Port 1), 
otherwise, Bob deletes the bit. Alice and Bob repeat the process until the 
whole signal string is sent, "bright flash" means that two photons have been 
projected on Bob's detection vector. Bob's method can be summarized as a 
screening criterion: An output hit from the optical coupler is recorded, if 
and only if Bob finds that two photons are projected on the detector at one 
port and nothing is projected on the detector at the other port. This criterion 
solves the problem caused by noise. Bob's measurements are based on a 
homodyne detection scheme, where both detectors are arranged in terms of 
the tap-fibre mode used by Bob himself. If the tap-fibre mode is based on 
bs, both detectors should also be set towcird the x direction; if the tap-fibre 
mode is based on b^, both detectors should be set up toward the y direction. 
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4: Bob keeps B and B' = secret. Alice keeps A secret. 
5: Bob speaks to Alice publicly for each /?•: Accept if Bob "saw" a bright flash at 
Port 1 (2) and nothing at Port 2(1) (obeying the screening criterion); reject 
if Bob "saw" flashes at both ports or other instances which do not satisfy the 
screening criterion. 
6: Since Bob's result contains a large number of flaw bits owing to quantum 
noise and overlapping, Bob must announce to Alice which detection vector 
has been used for each accepted bit, but nothing about the outcome of the 
measurement. Alice asks Bob to detect all bits obtained using an incorrect 
detection vector, for example, Alice may ask him to detect a north-state-
related "0" bit which is obtained by using This step ensures that all flaw 
bits subject to the overlaps with two closer neighbour states (but not the 
opposite state) are removed. (We will give more explanation later.) 
7: Bob's remaining bits still contain a large fraction of flaw bits subject to overlap 
with the opposite states. In order to correct (but not remove) the flaw bits, 
the following steps should be taken: 
— Alice secretly divides all remaining bits related to each state, east, north, 
west, or south into N groups {N > 100), where each group contains 
m (m > 30) bits. This requires that the number of original signal bits 
sent by Alice are sufficient. Each group involves only one signal state, 
but both binary bits. Amongst these binary bits, one fraction of binary 
bits ("0" or "1") stems from the correct detections and these bits are 
the majority; the other group of binary bits ("1" or "0") come from the 
overlap on the opposite state. Note that during the grouping the original 
positions of the bits were not changed. 
— Alice publicly announces the grouping result, without releasing any en-
coding information. So nobody knows which group belongs to which 
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state, except Alice herself. Since each Bob's detection vector has been 
used to two nonorthogonal states, knowing the detection vector of each 
group releases not encoding information of the group. 
— Bob calculates the number of "0" or "1" bits in each group. The encoding 
of the majority bits will represent the encoding of all bits in the group. 
For example, if Bob finds that "0" bits are the majority, he will regard 
all bits in the group as "0". So far Bob hcis corrected all mistakes caused 
by the overlap with the corresponding opposite state and determined the 
encoding of each group. This step can only be implemented by Bob, 
because he is the only one who knows the measurement result. 
— Bob tells Alice the positions of all useful bits. Alice knows the full infor-
mation of these bits. 
8: Alice and Bob keep the bits which have eventually survived as the secret key. 
Table 3.2 shows all possible detection results in Bob's coupler when both light 
pulses have the same intensity. Instead of illustrating all cases in the table, we 
only focus on the first case, where Alice uses the east state as . The explanations 
for the remaining Ccises are similar. When Bob uses BE (consistently use 14), 
according to the coupling equations, there are two possible outcomes: (1) The 
output at port 1 is enhanced and the output at port 2 is reduced to a vacuum 
state due to the cancellation. Bob then further checks whether the outputs satisfy 
the screening criterion. If the answer is yes, a "0" is accordingly recorded. (2) 
Because of the superposition between the east state and the opposite west state, a 
large fraction of bits associated with the ecist state turn out to be mixed with the 
west state, and Bob could then have a false result, i.e. a "1" could be recorded. 
The late bit is obviously wrong, but Bob does not realize his mistake. In order 
to overcome this problem, Alice uses the error correcting method described in 
the protocol. The mechanism of this error correcting method is simple: since the 
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overlap between the states is not 100%, there is a larger probability of obtaining 
the east state rather than the west state. This is obviously true, because only if 
the superposition is 100%, the probability of obtaining the east state or the west 
state is 1/2, 
By means of a Q-representation, we can further explain the error correcting 
method. A coherent state a in a Q-representation is given by 
Qil) = (3 .18) TT 
which actually represents a quasi-probability of the coherent state. For the east 
coherent state with an average projection value of 0.33 (an intensity of 0.1 photon) 
on the X axis (on the quadrature phase plane), the probability of a projection 
being around 1 on a small region (Ax) • y, where —oo < y < oo, is given by 
P{projection = l\a = 0.33) = w 0.36Ax, (3.19) 
y/TT 
while the probability of projection being —1 on the small region is given by 
P{projecti(m = - l|a = 0.33) = w 0.0963Ax. (3 .20) 
yJ-K 
It is eclsy to find that, amongst total pulses with a value 1 or —1 projection on 
X axis, the 1-pulses is 79% and the —1-pulses 21%. According to these data, we 
may roughly calculate the correctness rate of Bob's error correcting: assuming 
that m = 30 and the minimal number of bits mm,n for Bob to correctly identify 
the encoding is greater than m/2 = 15, we have the correctness rate: 
m 
P(mmin > ml2) = 1 - E 
»•=1 
/ 
v 
(0.79)*(0.21)'"-* « 0.9996. (3.21) 
This value suggests that Bob is almost 100% correct. Note however that if an 
eavesdropper wants to measure the signal, she cannot have such a high ratio of 
1-pulses to —1-pulses, since her detection is subject to the superposition from 
other two neighbour states, the north and south states. Bob does not have this 
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problem, because Alice can ask him to delete all bits owing to the superposition 
with the two neighbour states. This case will be further studied in next section. 
We now focus on the second case, i.e., Alice still uses a = ai and Bob uses the 
other mode b^ (consistently uses Vy). Bob is obviously wrong. Most possibly, 
the outputs at one or both ports are nonzero. Bob can thus "view" a light flash 
with a various intensity at one or both ports. These bits are useless and can be 
removed in terms of the screening criterion. However, since the measurement is 
subject to the noise or overlaps, we must consider that Bob might occasionally 
obtain a result which meets the screening criterion. When this happens. Bob will 
not be able to identify the flaw. In order to get rid of these flaw bits, no matter 
what measurement result has been obtained, Alice will cisk Bob to delete the bits. 
We have not explained the influence of overlaps associated with the two neighbour 
states, the north and south states. These instances actually belong to other two 
c£ise where Alice sends the north or south state. The corresponding flaw bits will 
be handled by Alice and Bob using a similar procedure given above. 
3.2.3 Eavesdropping 
Assume that there is an adversary called Eve who attempts to eavesdrop on 
Alice and Bob's communication. Eve can launch an intercept/resend attack. 
The first method Eve could choose is to measure the intercepted signal by using 
a similar optical coupler. If she does so, at lecist half of her mecisurements will 
be random, because she hcis to randomly select her tap-fibre states and detection 
vectors. Moreover, the remaining half of Bob's measurements are also uncertain 
due to the superposition of Alice's signal. Therefore, it is impossible for Eve to 
regenerate and resend the signal to Bob, using her own measurement. 
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Assume that Eve knows that four projection operators, {Vi-x, Vi, and 
can be used to detect Alice's signal and these detection vectors respectively suit 
detecting as^ aw^ cln-, and as. Eve might then wish to use her detector to measure 
Alice's signal directly, instead of using an optical coupler. However since she 
does not know which state has been sent by Alice, she has no better way than 
to choose a detection vector randomly. The probability of choosing the correct 
detection vector is obviously 1/4. Fortunately, even if she happens to select the 
correct detector, her measurement is still uncertain because of the overlap of the 
encoding states. If Eve has a correct detection vector and knows that a projection 
of value 1 is important, it is not hard to find there is a probability of 3/5 for her to 
obtain a wrong projection belonging to the neighbour states. These bits cannot 
be identified by Eve. The total success rate of measuring a bit is found to be 
1/10, which suggests that there is little chance of Eve succeeding. 
Eve may not do anything but just listens to Alice 2uid Bob's public conversation. 
After Alice and Bob's implementation of the protocol is complete. Eve is aware 
which detection vector has been used, which bits were accepted, and which the 
detection vector has been applied to ecich group chosen by Alice. Because each 
detection vector corresponds to two nonorthogonal states, Eve can only guess 
whether the bits in each group belong to either "0" or "1". Hence, for each 
individual group. Eve has a 1/2 chance to succeed. However, since the number 
of groups N > 100, Eve's success rate will be less than 1/2^°° or approximately 
1/10^^°. In practice, it is highly unlikely for Eve to succeed. 
3.2.4 Signal to noise ratio 
We now turn our attention to the signal to noise ratio. We study the coupling 
quadrature amplitude aj. The other cases are similar. By averaging over the 
signal we find that the ratio of the intensity signal to noise for homodyne detection 
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in coupling mode a[ is 
.2, [(1 -/c)>/2(ai) + «>/i(6,)]2 SNR=w)7(Aan = (3.22) 
where only bright output pulses are considered (according to the screening crite-
rion, only output at one port is bright). 
Because the tap-fibre mode is controlled by Bob, Bob can use a specific photon 
source. In particular, Bob can use squeezed light. One quadrature component 
(say ai) of the field has smaller fluctuations than the other quadrature component 
(say «2), in terms of the uncertainty principle. Explicitly, (Aaf) < 1 / 4 and 
(Aoj) > 1/4. Using the quadrature component with smaller noise can greatly 
improve the signal to noise ratio of the system. 
We focus on the signal to noise ratio in which mode 6 is a squeezed state and 
mode a is a coherent state. The noise observed in detection comes from both 
the signal mode sent by Alice (a) and the auxiliary tap-fibre mode (6). If the 
intensity for both modes is equal, we obtain the ratio: 
= 2 , (3 .23) 
SNR^k ' (Aal) 
where SNRgq denotes the signal to noise ratio when the mode 6 is a perfect 
squeezed state; SNRcoh is the signal to noise ratio both Alice and Bob use co-
herent light. We have assumed /c = 1/2. It is found that a doubling of the signal 
to noise ratio has been obtained. 
3.3 C O N C L U S I O N 
We have summarized the BB protocol and presented a quantum cryptographic 
system based on the optical coupler and four nonorthogonal states modeled by 
using quantized arguments: quadrature phase amplitudes of light field. It will 
be the first demonstration of the usefulness of quadrature phase amplitudes and 
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the optical coupler to quantum cryptography. We have also showed that the 
communication efficiency can be improved by using squeezed light to the tap fibre. 
Photon attenuation has not been studied in this paper, however, the protocol 
proposed in this work also fits the situation when leakage of photons occurs. The 
reason is simply that Bob can discard all bits which do not satisfy the screening 
criterion and keep those which satisfy the screening criterion. If the leakage is 
considerable large, Alice may make her signal a bit stronger, say 0.15 photon on 
the average. The slightly stronger signal will not make the security worse. 
4 
QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY BASED ON 
BELL'S INEQUALITY 
Ekert was the first person to propose that the quantum correlation could be used 
for quantum cryptography. His invention is an EPR-type apparatus which, based 
on Bell's inequality, assures the security in cryptographic communications. In this 
chapter we use calculations involving Bell's inequality to study Ekert's protocol, 
in both photon-based and spin-|-particle-based systems. These calculations give 
an independent verification of Ekert's protocol. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the well-known Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen-Bohm gedankenexperiment (EPR) [4, 
27], a source emits pairs of spin-| particles in a singlet state (or pairs of photons 
5]). When a pair of particles leaves the source, one particle travels towards 
analyzer A while the other travels towards analyzer B. The measurement of 
correlations of their spin components (or polarization for photons) is performed 
by analyzers along arbitrary directions which can be described by unit vectors a 
and b. Each measurement of a spin-| particle, in the amount of can yield two 
opposite results: -f-1 if the spin is found to be parallel with the direction of the 
analyzer, and —1 if opposite to the direction of the analyzer. Under the physical 
reality criterion [27], such a measurement fulfills Bell's inequality [7], but violates 
quantum mechanics. 
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Ekert envisaged the usefulness of the EPR experiment and Bell's inequality in 
secure communications [13]. In the scheme proposed by Ekert, a secure quantum 
key can be achieved by exploiting the properties of quantum-correlated particles. 
Any eavesdropper unavoidably adds some local condition which causes the data 
measured by legitimate users to display no violation of Bell's inequality, this in 
turn reveals the attempt at interception. 
4 . 2 P H O T O N - B A S E D S Y S T E M 
We first present a detailed analysis for the photon-based system. A light source 
controlled by Alice generates a pair of photons with a certain polarization, obeying 
the rules of the entangled two-photon state or the so-called "non-product state 
" [31]. One photon travels along the single mode optical fiber towards Bob's 
analyzer and the other photon is sent to Alice's analyzer. The first passes through 
Bob's polarization analyzer, emerging in either the horizontal (-|-) channel, or the 
vertical (—) channel. Alice's measurement is similar. The direction of Bob's 
analyzer and the direction of Alice's analyzer are can be rotated at will. The 
plane of the analyzer is orthogonal to that of the propagation direction of the 
photons. Let a± {b±) be the annihilation operator for the horizontally (-1-) or 
vertically (—) polarized mode for the field traveling to Alice's analyzer (Bob's 
analyzer). Using ni,722,713 and 714 to denote the numbers of photons in mode 
a+,a_,6+ and respectively, we have the state |ni, 7 2 2 ) 0 I n terms of 
linear polarizations, the state of the two entangled photons may be written as 
1$) = 0)a |1, 0>6 + |0, 1>.|0,1>6). (4.1) 
We have supposed that the light source produces two identical photons each 
time, that is both Alice's and Bob's analyzers receive photons with the same 
polarization. 
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The measurement is carried out by rotating Alice's analyzer by an angle 6i or 
Bob's analyzer by O2. The modes detected are thus orthogonal transformations 
of the modes of the signal. In Alice's Ccise, 
c^ = a^ cos Oi + a_ sin (4.2) 
c_ = —a^ sin 61 + a_ cos 61, (4.3) 
while in Bob's measurement, the modes detected are given by 
d+ = b^ cos 02 + sin 62, (4.4) 
d - = —b^ sin 02 + cos (4.5) 
Note that 0i and 02 are actually the angles between the photon polarization and 
the direction of the corresponding analyzer, respectively. 
Consider the correlation functions: 
Fiff ff ^ - iSlLiiniltillA Ufi^ 
where (/?=) and { i t ) 
are the intensities measured by Alice's analyzer and Bob's 
analyzer respectively. Equation (4.6) is valid where there is no eavesdropping. 
In terms of the detected mode operators given by equations (4.2) - (4.5), this 
correlation function can be rewritten as 
^ " (: icic++ clc.)(did++ did.)-.)' 
where : : denotes normal order. This correlation function can be evaluated for 
the state in (4.1), 
= cos 2(^1 - ^ 2 ) . (4.8) 
Using this result, one may estimate Bell's quantity 
5 = ¡£(61,02) - E(eu6'2)\ + \Ei0[,e'2) + Eie[,02)\. (4.9) 
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Choosing 
we obtain 
5 = 3 cos 29 — cos 6^. (4 .10) 
Consider = 0, = x/4 for Alice's analyzer and 62 = :r/8, = 37r/8 for Bob's 
analyzer. The we have 5 = 2y/2. It is clear that this violates Bell's inequality 
51 < 2. This result has also been obtained in [32]. 
When Eve's eavesdropping occurs (of course in the arm towards Bob only, which 
is different from the conventional method where both EPR arms are attacked), 
by such means as measuring and substituting photons, the correlation function 
then hcLS the form (see Appendix A at the end of this chapter): 
(4 .11) 
where 
^ebiSe)) = 
with 
= cos 6e + e_ sin 9e, 
5_ = —6+ sin 9c + e_ cos 9 .̂ 
All operators in (4.11) are in normal order. is an entangled two-photon 
state corresponding to modes x and y in the case that Eve is present. e± denotes 
Eve's modes. The angle 9e in Eve's apparatus is distributed according to some 
density p{9e). (4.11) can be expressed as an explicit form, 
E{9i, 92) = J p{9e) cos 2{9i - 9c) cos 2(^2 - 0c)d9c. (4 .12) 
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The eavesdropping is equivalent to inducing an EPR local reality on the EPR axm 
towards Bob. Substituting (4.12) into (4.9) and considering Bi = 0, = 7r/4 for 
Alice's analyzer and O2 = TT/S, 62 — STT/S for Bob's analyzer, we obtain S = \/2. 
Clearly, this does not violate Bell's inequality. For comparison, in figure 4.1, we 
plot 5 cLS a function of 0 both in the presence of eavesdropping, (4.8), and in the 
absence of eavesdropping. 
ui 0 
Figure 4.1 Bell's S quantity is plotted as a function of 6. The solid-curve plots the 
case free of eavesdropping. The dashed-line (with an intercept of about 1.4) represents 
the case of eavesdropping. 
Following Ekert's method [13], Alice and Bob choose orientations of their ana-
lyzers and knowing that some of them will be identical and some of them will be 
different. The results from the mecisurements with different orientations are used 
to calculate the S value, for which the calculation of a typical example Wcis illus-
trated above. If the signal is not directly or indirectly disturbed, namely violation 
of Bell's inequality is observed, the results from the measurements using the same 
orientation can be used as a secret key. A suitable choice of the directions of the 
analyzers is: Oi = 0, 7r/4, TT/S; 62 = tt/S, STT/S, 7r/4. 
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4.3 SPIN-i-PARTICLE-BASED SYSTEM 
In the following, we show that the system based on spin-| particles has a similar 
feature. Suppose that the direction of Alice's analyzer is represented by a unit 
vector a and the direction of Bob's analyzer is a unit vector 6. A source controlled 
by Alice produces a pair of spin-| particles a and /?, which have an opposite spin 
direction. Particle a which is kept by Alice hcis spin described by the spin matrix 
flr(a) and particle ^ which travels toward Bob hcis spin described by 
The quantum-mechanical correlation function, in the case of the singlet state, is 
given by 
E{a, b) = (jPa(3\a • a{a) 0 ¿?(/3) • ¿IV'A/J) = -a-l ( 4 . 1 3 ) 
where the singlet state ¡tpap) = ^a^J)- "̂ a ^̂ ^ eigenvectors 
corresponding to the eigenvalues +1 and —1, respectively, of the Pauli matrix 
that represents the third component of the spin angular momentum for 
a . Up and u^ are the eigenvectors corresponding to the eigenvalues +1 and —1 
for the Pauli matrix (Tzil̂ ) for ¡3. Consider two orthogonal unit vectors a and a', 
associated with particle a and two orthogonal unit vectors b and b\ associated 
with particle 13. According to (4.13), using 0 and -tt for a and a' and |7r and —• —• 
for b and 6', it is easy to show that 
S = \E{a,b) - E{a,b')\ + \E{a',b') + E{a\b)\ = 2 ^ 2 . ( 4 . 1 4 ) 
When Eve is present on the EPR arm towards Bob, the correlation function is 
given by 
E{a, b) = J • a{a) 0 a{e) • • e 0 6 • a{/3)\M 
= J ( 4 . 1 5 ) 
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where e denotes the unit vector cissociated with particle e sent by Eve; a(e) 
denotes the Pauli matrix for e; the normalized probability p(e) describes the 
eavesdropper's strategy. Using the same parameters as those used in (4.14), in 
(4.15) we obtain S = \/2, which clearly does not violate Bell's inequality. This 
result suggests that the spin-|-particle-based system using one EPR arm is also 
secure. 
In conclusion, we have shown the correctness of Ekert's protocol. The agreement 
between Ekert's calculation and our calculation is that eavesdropping on the EPR 
arm towards Bob leads to no violation of Bell's inequality therefore revecding any 
attempt at eavesdropping. 
Appendix A 
The correlation of random variables A and B is defined by 
C{A,B) = ^{AB), (4 .16) 
provided (A) = {B) = 0, where M = ||i4|| • ||J?||. Suppose that E represents a 
random variable due to Eve and / denotes the probability density function of E^ 
then the correlation function of A and B may be derived as follows: 
CiA,B) = J J abfAB{a,b)dadb 
= ^ J J fE{^)fAB\E{a,b\e)dadbde 
= ¿r / fsie) J J abfAB\E(a, b\e)dadbde, (4 .17) 
where /ab and fAB\E are the joint probability density function of A and B, and 
the conditional joint probability density function given E respectively. If A and 
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B are independent when E is given, then 
C{A,B) = ¡ ÍE{e)[¡ afA\E{a\e)da j hfB\E{h\e)dh]de 
(4 .18) 
5 
QUANTUM CONFERENCE KEY 
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
In this chapter, we investigate quantum cryptographic protocols which could 
be suitable for conference key distribution systems. The information theoreti-
cal limits are shown to describe quantum-cryptographically protected multi-user 
optical communication channels. An estimation of the eavesdropping via "inter-
cept/resend" for each quantum system is given. It is shown that the information 
and correlation formalism reveals such attacks. 
The chapter is arranged as follows: Section 5.1 introduces our conference key 
distribution models; Section 5.2 is devoted to studying the information theory on 
the conference key distribution protocols; Section 5.3 presents the theory of the 
correlation function. In the final section, we discuss some other the conference key 
distribution systems and summarize our work. Part of contents of this chapter 
has been published in Proceeding of International Symposium on Information 
Theory & Its Applications. [25 
Before we start, it should be made clear that there are some fundamental problems 
for practical uses of our quantum conference key protocols. These problems will 
be summarized in the conclusion of this chapter. We also like to thank one of 
thesis referees pointed out some of these problems. 
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5.1 CONFERENCE KEY DISTRIBUTION PROTOCOLS 
Quantum cryptographic communication based on the BB protocol involves two 
users, who share no secret information, together with an adversary Eve who eaves-
drops on their communications. A multi-user cryptosystem involves complicated 
cryptographic communication, including quantum key distribution and system 
configurations, since a quantum cryptographic channel is based on two-user com-
munication. In figures 5.1 (a) and (b), we propose two quantum conference 
key distribution systems for N legitimate users C/Q, t^IJ ^AT-I- Figure 5.1 
(a) describes a fan-shaped configuration; and (b) presents a series configuration. 
Many other configurations can be constructed based on these. 
(b) 
O 
Uo Ui U2 UN-I 
UN-1 
Figure 5.1 A schematic diagram of the quantum conference key distribution cryp-
tosystems with N legitimate users, (a) shows a fan-shaped configuration; (b) shows a 
series configuration. 
In the case of the fan-shaped configuration, we consider two ways for the key 
construction between legitimate users. For method one, or type Fi, we consider 
a quantum protocol similar to the BB protocol, where as principal user or chair, 
UQ sends a random sequence of single-photon pulses based on either BI or B2 
(with a 50-50 chance for each basis) to Ui,U2,U3, respectively. The 
photon pulse for every channel, at any instant time should be polarized to the 
same direction. Subsequently, receivers measure each photon pulse using the 
measuring bases, Bi or B2, which are chosen randomly and independently. In 
contrast to the BB protocol in the two-user situation, in the public discussion UQ 
has to be told which basis has been chosen for each photon pulse by every other 
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user, then she tells them which measuring basis is correct. The correct basis is 
the basis used correctly by all the users in the relevant mecisurements. They then 
agree to discard mecisurements which used an incorrect basis and those were lost 
in the transmissions. The remaining photon pulses, which have been correctly 
measured, are used as a shared key distribution in future secure communications. 
In the above scenario, if a photon state (sent to all other users by say \OL)UÔ  
survives all mecisurements via legitimate users, it is used for key distribution. 
Note that all users receive a photon pulse (state) possessing the same polarization, 
hence, for the sake of simplicity, we denote it by \ot)uQ' We assume that there is a 
common operator, ¿/, responsible for the measurement of \OL)UO', where |a)i7o is an 
eigenvector of U. Then all the elements in the final key distribution are obtained 
in terms of the measurement: 
Ù \ A ) U , = A \ A ) U O . ( 5 . 1 ) 
where a € { "0 " , "1 " } , \A)UO € {| Î) , | / ) , | \ ) } , and Ù € {ÔB^Ô^J. 
More explicitly, 
A A * A A 
Ofîi, when UQ = UI = ...UN-I = OB^, 
C/ = S A A A A A ( 5 . 2 ) 
Y OB2J when UQ = UI = ...UN-I = OB^-
A A A 
Ui is obtained by choosing OB, and OB, randomly and independently, 
i;. = Rand(ÔB„ÔBj, (i = 0 , l , 2 , . . . , i V - l ) , (5.3) 
A * 
where Rand, obtained using a random number generator, is either OBI or OB^. 
The probability that a single-photon pulse survives the measurements is 
This suggests that the probability is a decreasing function of the number of users. 
For method two, or type F2 (also Fig. 5.1 (a)), a conference key distribution 
is established by utilizing a combined channel. As chair, UQ first generates a 
conference key distribution herself, using her own random number generator. In 
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order to send the conference key to other legitimate users, she has to establish 
private keys with all other users through quantum channels. Hence bcised on the 
BB protocol private quantum key communications are established for each pair 
of users, UQ ^ UI, UQ ^ 1/2^ UQ i /3, ... . We denote the keys as kuoUn KUOU2F 
KUOUS'" • Obviously, UQ knows all the information about the key distributions. In 
order to send the conference key distribution, say Kconf̂  to another user, say Ui, 
Kconf must have the same size as the local private key distribution kuoUi between 
Uo and Ui. After all the private keys have been established, the conference key 
can be sent to all legitimate users through a classical channel. The information 
sent to Ui through the classical channel is a Boolean addition between these keys, 
Coi = KconS ® ku^Ui, (5-4) 
which releases no information to an eavesdropper. The conference key can be 
extracted by Ui by 
KconJ = C o i ® k u o U r (5.5) 
For the series configuration, figure 5.1 (b), we also consider two ways to establish 
a conference key distribution. The first or type 5i, is similar to type Fi, UQ the 
principal user or chair sends a random sequence of information to Ui using the 
BB protocol; after mecisuring each photon pulse as Bob, Ui then reproduces it 
and sends it to U2 (after all bits have been transmitted by i/o); U2 follows the 
same method to pass the information to U3] this process is continued from Ui to 
Ui+i until the final user receives the information. Note here that by "reproduce" 
we mean that Ui produces a similar (new) photon pulse that has the same polar-
ization to the one he has measured (including incorrect measurements arising due 
to the uncertainty principle). Obviously, only part of the instances which have 
been measured using a correct operator can be "reproduced" ; the rest are incor-
rect (all incorrect instances can be discarded after a public discussion). In the 
public discussion all users (except the chair) announced publicly which operator 
6 0 C H A P T E R 5 QUANTUM C O N F E R E N C E K E Y DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
was used for each mecLsurement, thus they are aware of any photon pulse which 
hits survived (with the help of "regeneration") after the final user's measurement. 
Thus they are able to determine which pulses will be used in the conference key 
distribution which will be shared by all legitimate users. Since losses caused by 
each user's measurement, the number of users is limited. This method is not 
practical if a number of users are involved. 
In the second case of series configuration, type S2, which is similar to type ^2» 
Uo prepares a conference key distribution which will be sent using the private 
quantum keys established between all pairs, UQ ^ U\ ^ U2, U2 ^ U3, ..., 
bcised on the BB protocol. The conference key distribution chosen by the chair 
is sequentially propagated from UQ to other legitimate users, one after the other, 
via Boolean addition through a classical channel. Each user plays a role zis a 
repeater, 
UQ—^U\: CQI = Kconf ® kUoUx, Kconi = ^01 © ^UQUX \ 
Ui U2 : Cu = Kconf © ^l/it/a, Kconf = Cu ® ku^U^'^ 
U2 Us : C23 = Kconf 0 kUiUii Kconf = © ku^Ui', 
Eavesdropping (say, intercept/resend) on any branch of the quantum channel can 
be detected since the eavesdropper has to randomly choose the basis in an attack 
so that some information must be randomized (which leads to the possibility that 
the legitimate users disagree). The multi-user situation provides more opportu-
nities for eavesdroppers, this case is thus more complicated. For the fan-shaped 
configuration, Fi, an eavesdropping attack can be detected only by a pair of 
users (including the chair) whose communication has been attacked (we exclude 
a grouped attack, which will be discussed later). For the series configuration. 
Si, a single eavesdropping will affect later communications for the rest of users. 
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Once an attack has been detected, the key establishment has to be restarted af-
ter all eavesdroppers have been removed. An eavesdropper can only avoid being 
detected, if she/he manages to choose the correct measuring bcisis as that of the 
targeted legitimate users. This is not possible unless she gets access to at least 
one of the random number generators used by the legitimate users. 
For configurations F2 and 82-, before sending the conference key distribution, UQ 
must make sure all private keys are secure. To do this, user Ui sends UQ a string 
message encrypted by the private key kuoUn through a clcissical channel. After 
UQ has decrypted it, also using kuoUn UI speaks publicly about the content of the 
message. If UQ finds the message she has measured is not identical to that of UI, 
she is then aware that the private key is not secure and the eavesdropper must 
be removed. The same procedure must be repeated with all users. 
We should also point out potential attacks of grouped eavesdroppers who com-
municate each other. Our main concern is focused on type Fi. When the number 
of legitimate users is sufficiently large, eavesdroppers can extract by dividing the 
channels connecting UQ and other users into two groups; group one is measured 
A A 
by using OBI and group two is measured by using OBJ- For a physical pulse, one 
of the measuring operators must have been used incorrectly and will thus lead to 
imcertain results in those measurements. Mecinwhile, the measurements in the 
other group definitely provide the correct result. If a number of eavesdroppers are 
involved, they can immediately discovered which measurement is correct without 
any information about encoding bases! Notice that this method can only be valid 
when the number of legitimate users is sufficiently large. Three or four legitimate 
users are not enough to provide eavesdroppers with sufficient chances to eaves-
drop (later, we will have more discussion using channel information theory). The 
other three schemes remain secure agcdnst any multi-eavesdropper attack. 
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All conference key distribution protocols in this work are based on the BB pro-
tocol. To simplify our analysis in the rest of this work, we define two conditions: 
Condition : UQ sends UI a random sequential photon pulse bcised on one of four 
canonical photon states related to bases Bi or B2. We assume that the probability 
of each state is equal. To be consistent, there is also equal probability for "0" and 
"1" to occur. Ui measures the photon state by choosing a measuring operator, 
A A 
OBI or OB2 randomly and independently, so that the probability of each operator 
being chosen is 1/2. However, UQ and UI do not carry out any public discussion 
about which mecisuring basis (operator) has been used. Note that if the basis 
used by Ui was wrong, Ui has probability 1/2 of obtaining "0" or "1". 
Condition (2: Initially, the same as condition Ci. However, UQ and £/,-, now 
discuss publicly which basis is correct for each measurement and agree to discard 
all instances in which incorrect bases have been used by Ui in the measurements. 
For example, for a two-user system, the mapping for sent/received signal bits 
corresponding to conditions Ci and are shown in figure 5.2. 
We now assume that all eavesdroppers use the "intercept/resend" method and 
perform their measurements using methods similar to those of a legitimate user 
Ui, i.e. randomly choosing measuring basis (probability 1/2 for each basis). 
5.2 INFORMATION THEORY OF MULTIUSER 
CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
Information theory can be used to estimate the merit of quantum channels. Here, 
we investigate how eavesdropping affects the information flow, and how much 
information Eve can obtain from eavesdropping. 
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(a) 
(b) 
Figure 5.2 The mapping of sent/received signal bits for the BB protocol: (1) in the 
absence of Eve and (2) in the present of Eve. (a) represents the condition Cil (b) 
represents the condition C2-
5.2.1 Information theory in Quantum Channels 
Information theory for the BB protocol 
We now develop the information formalism for the multiuser system of quantum 
cryptography, based on information theory [33]. 
We first consider a two-user quantum cryptosystem based on the BB protocol. 
Assume that there are two users, A and B, the average mutual information can 
be defined as: 
7(5; A) = H{B) - H{B\A), (5.6) 
where 
H(B) = -¿P(6.)log2P(6.), 
t=l 
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»•=1 i=i 
the lower-case characters represent the eigenvalues of the corresponding operators. 
A A 
A {B) is a quantum-mechanical operator denoting a measurement by A {B). A, 
A * A 
B G {0BI,0B2}. Using quantum-mechanical states to represent the condition 
probabilities, we have P(6j|a,) = |(a,|6j)P. 
Under the BB protocol, channel information based on (5.6) becomes 
/ (J5; i ) = 1 + ^¿¿P(6i|a,) log2P(6,|a,) (bits). (5.7) 
^ t=i i=i 
This quantity varies between 0 and 1, where 1 corresponds to full channel in-
formation; 0 corresponds to zero channel information;. Assuming that a,- and hj 
have binary values either 0 or 1. The information for condition Ci can be obtained 
from: 
/ ( B ; i ) = j l o g j 3 - l . (5.8) 
In the presence of Eve, the information is then given by 
Y 2 2 2 2 
IE{B',À) = 1 + (5.9) 2 ^ iL^lZ^ ,=1 j=l k=l Jb=l 
Under condition Ci we obtain the mutual information when Eve is present, 
IsiB; = ^(3 log2 3 -h 5 logj 5) - 2. (5.10) 
Following Barnett et al. [34], we introduce a dimensionless parameter (̂ ab defined 
by A A A A 
lEiB;A)-mA) 
UB = ; — 7 6 ~ Y \ ' 
IMAXIB; A) 
where the maximum mutual information I^ax is 1 in above cases and — 1 < (ab < 
1- Cab < 0 indicates the eavesdropper has caused a reduction of information in 
the quantum channel between A and B and (AB > 0 indicates an increase of 
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information, ÂB = 0 represents the absence of eavesdropping, or, the eaves-
dropping is undetectable which occurs only in the case where the eavesdropper 
chose identical measuring bases to B. Fortunately, the probability of the eaves-
dropper having so chosen is almost zero when the size of the information string 
is large. Using (5.8) and (5.10) we obtain: UB = -0.1431, as the evidence of 
eavesdropping. 
For condition in the absence of eavesdropping, from (5.7) we obtciin the mutual 
• A A 
information I{B; A) = 1 if the measurement via B is perfect; in the presence of 
eavesdropping, the channel information is IE(B,A) = f logjS - 1. Using (5.11), 
we obtain ÂB = —0.8, also showing an incidence of eavesdropping. 
How much information can Eve obtain from her eavesdropping? Our calculation 
shows / (A, E) = \ logj 3 — 1 « 0.12, agreeing with (5.8). In compcirison, the value 
is 1 for a perfect detection by Bob; so Eve virtually achieves nothing. Moreover, 
her detection has led to a significant change of the information flow, as we showed 
previously. 
Channel information for type Fi 
Next, we consider the conference key distribution systems. For type Fi, we as-
sume that the discrete quantum channels can be treated as an integrated channel. 
This is valid only if UQ sends an identical photon signal to all other users. In the 
presence of a number, NE^ of eavesdroppers, if each invaded quantum channel 
has only one attacker who attacks only once and the eavesdroppers do not com-
municate with each other, using condition the channel information can be 
expressed as 
i 1 
IF , = L I X ; % ) = + ^ E E ^(^IL'^O = 0 LOG^ P ( X , K = (5.12) 
^ ¿=oi=i 
66 CHAPTER 5 QUANTUM CONFERENCE KEY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
A A A A 
where X = (Ui, C/2, • • •, U N - I ) ] the eigenvalues are x = (ui, ii2, • • •, WAT - I ) , with 
Uj = "0" or "1"; Xj denotes the jih. state of x; 
W = 
Ne + 1, ïîN-Ne>1 and Ne > 0 
NE, Ï{ N - NE = I AIND NE >0 
1 if NE = 0 
and 
P(xj\uo = i) = P{UI,U2,...,UN-1\U0 = i) 
= P{ui\uo = i)P{U2\UO = i)'" P{UN-I\UQ = i), (5.13) 
which is the conditional probability given NE eavesdropping attacks. 
A A A A 
For example, if there are four users, X = (C/i, i/2, t^a); the eavesdropper only 
attacks the quantum channel between UQ and UI] x hcLS four states Xi = (0,0,0), 
X2 = (1,0,0), X3 = (0,1,1), X4 = (1,1,1); then we can use (5.13) to calculate the 
conditional probability, for instance 
P {x i |uo = 0) = P{ui = 0, W2 = 0, U3 = 0|wo = 0) 
= P(ui = 0|uo = 0)P(u2 = 0|wo = 0)P(u3 = 0|uo = 0) 
= 3 / 4 x 1 x 1 = 3/4, 
and so on. Our discussion is valid only if the following assumption is true: when 
a user chooses a wrong basis he has probability 1/2 of receiving "0" or "1", which 
is consistent with condition (2- In the absence of eavesdropping, (5.12) gives 
/f. = 1. 
The information loss due to eavesdropping is an increasing function of the number 
of eavesdroppers. Consistently, the channel information expressed by (5.12) is an 
decreasing function of the number of eavesdroppers. 
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Cîarougedeavesdr̂ ï̂̂  
Failure 
Figure 5.3 The mapping for grouped eavesdropping. Failure means that eavesdrop-
pers cannot identify the information, as they have to obtain identical bits in measure-
ments based on an incorrect basis. We have assumed that if grouped eavesdroppers 
obtain different bits in measurements under the same basis, they know they have used 
an incorrect basis. 
As an example, we calculate the information of four legitimate users as a function 
of Ne, 
Ne = I, If, = 0.824; 
Ne = 2, If, = 0.648; 
Ne = 3, If, = 0.0715. 
The result here presented is obtained using condition and assuming the eaves-
droppers do not add in any of their own information. 
If the eavesdroppers communicate with each other, the security of Fi will be seri-
ously threatened, especially when there are many users. The strategy of grouped 
eavesdroppers is cis follows: 
If only three users including the chair (i.e. two quantum channels) involve the 
conference-key protocol, then consistently two eavesdroppers may also be involved 
the eavesdropping. For implementing a grouped attack, the eavesdroppers divide 
themselves into two groups, and each thus has one eavesdropper and employs a 
different measuring basis {Bi or B2). In an implementation of the F\ protocol, 
the chair sends each her partner a bit (say "1") which is encoded using B\ or 82 
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chosen at random. The eavesdroppers intercept and measure the corresponding 
bit. One of groups must obtain a correct measurement, i.e. "1" is obtained, 
because the correct basis is used. The other group must obtain an uncertain 
result ("1" or "0"), since the incorrect basis is used. If the second group obtain 
" r (hence both groups have "1"), the eavesdroppers will be aware that the chair 
has sent "1" and thus be successful. Although, in this case, they are successful to 
identify the correct bit, they have no idea about the basis employed by the chair. 
If the second group obtains "0" (hence each group has a different result), they 
will not be able to know which one is correct bit and thus fail. Note that grouped 
two eavesdroppers can obtain correct bit information, but they cannot regenerate 
a similar bit and resend it because of lack of the corresponding basis information. 
This situation will be changed if more users and thus more eavesdroppers involve 
a grouped attack. 
A system with four channels may be eavesdropped by four eavesdroppers. Simi-
larly to the above example, eavesdroppers can divide themselves into two groups, 
two for each group, émd each group uses a different measuring basis. Each eaves-
dropper attacks one channel. In an implementation of the Fi protocol, the chair 
sends a bit "1" based on the secret, random selected basis ^i. In a subsequent 
grouped attack, both eavesdroppers in the group using Bi will definitely obtain 
"1" and those in the other group using B2 will obtain an uncertain result ("1" 
or "0"). If in the second group one eavesdropper obtains "1" and the other one 
obtains "0", they are then aware that the correct answer is "1" and the basis is 
Bi, because the result in the second group indicates uncertainty which suggests 
that the basis used in the second group is incorrect. If both eavesdroppers in 
the second group obtain "l**, they still know that the correct result is "1", how-
ever they cannot determine the basis. If both eavesdroppers in the second group 
obtain "0", they will even not be able to determine the correct bit and then fail. 
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If more legitimate users involve Fi conference key protocol, grouped eavesdrop-
pers will have a better chance. In the following calculation, we will know how 
much information grouped eavesdropping can achieve. For simplicity, we consider 
an eavesdropping to be successful if the eavesdroppers obtain a correct bit, and 
ignore whether they can determine the corresponding beisis information. 
Assume that there are 2M eavesdroppers, say E i , E 2 , " ' , who are 
divided into two groups {Ei, - • - and {^M+I, ' ? t h e n the events 
sent by chair are "ai = 0" and "«2 = 1" and the events received by eavesdroppers 
(after communicating each other) are bi = "0", 62 = ""failure^ and 63 = "1", 
where "failure" means that eavesdroppers cannot determine the bit (see figure 
5.3). The probabilities concerning the measurement of grouped eavesdroppers 
are given by 
p(6i|ai) = 1 -2 /2^^ , 
p(6j|a,) = 1/2^, 
p(63|ai) = 0, 
p(6i|a2) = 0, 
p(62|a2) = 1/2^, 
p i h M = 1 - 2 / 2 ^ , 
P(h) = ( l - 2 / 2 ^ ) / 2 , 
P{b2) = 1/2^, 
p(b,) = ( l - 2 / 2 ^ ) / 2 , 
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2 4 6 
Figure 5.4 Channel information for grouped eavesdropping plotted as a function of 
the number of eavesdroppers. 
This leads to the following channel information between the chair and eavesdrop-
pers: 
3 2 3 
i=l t=l i = l 
[(1 - 2 /2^) log2((l - 2 /2^) /2) + 1/2^ log2(l/2^) 
+2(1 - 2/2^)log2(l - 2 /2^) + 2(2/2^) log2(2/2^),(5.14) 
where Xe represents the set of operators employed by the eavesdroppers. In 
figure 5.4, we plot Ievc as a function of M. We see Ievc is an increasing func-
tion in M. When M = iV/2 = 2, i.e. there are four eavesdroppers, the chcinnel 
information is 0.2. When M = A /̂2 > > 1, the channel information is approxi-
mately 1 which indicates full information. This is achieved without being told any 
basis information. Actually, a large number of grouped eavesdroppers can dis-
cover basis information employed in the chair's coding, in terms of their grouped 
measurements. After having full basis information, the eavesdroppers enable to 
regenerate and thus to resend the signal to corresponding legitimate users. This 
suggests that we will have Ip̂  = 1 , namely the eavesdropping cannot be detected. 
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Channel information for type Si 
For type 5i, the series configuration, a signal pulse has to be measured and resent 
by each user in turn reproducing the measurement. In order to study the channel 
information for the system, we first introduce a transition probability matrix 
between legitimate users U and under condition (2, 
Quv = 
where 
/ \ QUQVQ ? ^UQVl , (5.15) 
^ Qui vol Qu\vx y 
quiVj = P{v = j\u = i). 
The subscripts 0 and 1 denote a binary signal. 
The transition probability matrix for users Uq and UI in the series configuration 
is then 
QuoUi — QuoUiQuiUiQu^Ua—QUi.iUi' (5.16) 
The joint probability, in terms of the transition matrix, is given by 
P{UI = j,Uo = k) = P{uo = {kj = 0,1). (5.17) 
The mutual information for the quantum channel between Uq and UI is defined 
by 
I(Ui; = 1 + i E P{ui = j\uo = k) log, P{ui = j\uo = k). 2 (5.18) 
Assume that there are N users and Ne eavesdroppers (iV — 1 > Ne > 0) and 
each one quantum channel connecting two neighbouring users has at most one 
eavesdropper. So Ne quantum channels are attacked. For simplicity, we fur-
ther assume that the first Ne quantum channels are targeted. The transition 
probability matrix can then be expressed as 
= (5.19) 
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where Qi is the transition probability matrix between two neighbouring users 
whose channel is attacked and Q2 is an ordinary transition probability matrix of 
two attack-free neighbouring users. After a simple calculation, we find 
QI = 
' 3/4 1/4 
, 1/4 3/4 ] 
Q2 = 
0 1 
( 5 . 2 0 ) 
/ 
where we have used condition In terms of (5.15) and (5.17), we find the 
average mutual information is 
where 
1, {Ne = 0) 
iV-l E S i VK) ^ { N - N E - 1)/(£/O; UE)], {NE > 1) 
( 5 . 2 1 ) 
I{Uo-, Uk) = ^ 
1 - + 1) + iAr log,[(2* - + {k < NE) 
1, {Ne = 0) 
I(UO\ UN^). (K>NE> 1 ) 
Similarly to the case of type Fi, Is^ is a decreasing function of the number of 
eavesdroppers. 
In condition C2, we mentioned that a photon pulse which has been measured using 
a wrong basis is discarded. Hence only those photon pulses correctly measured 
are considered in the calculation of (5.12) and (5.21). However if we consider 
all the information sent by Uo including that discarded afterwards, the general 
channel information should be reduced by a factor of because only 1/2^"^ 
of the total photon pulses contributed to the conference key distribution. This 
implies that the channel information is a decreasing function in the number of 
users, N. 
The channel information is also a decreasing function in the number of eaves-
droppers. This indicates that the channels are secure. Furthermore, in contrast 
to Fi, it is immunized against grouped attacks. 
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5.2.2 Channel Information of Combined Channels 
Channel information for type F2 
For type F2, a private quantum key distribution for each quantum channel is 
established after the chair Uq hcis chosen a conference key distribution. A zero 
information string containing the Boolean addition of the related private key and 
the conference key is sent to each other legitimate user through clzissical channels 
by the chair. Therefore, the total number of information involves both quantum 
and classical channels. Suppose that the conference key distribution generated 
by Uq is one of Kuo^^tKuoai where m is total permutations for a certain 
size of string. The conference key distribution received by another user, C/», might 
not be the original one due to the possibility of attacks by eavesdroppers on the 
quantum channels: thus we assume it to be one of Kui^, Kui2i - "Fui^m' Hence, 
the private quantum key distribution obtained by Uq is one of kuo^^, ̂ t/0,25 •••̂ t/o.mî 
the private quantum key distribution of Ui is one of Â;c7, ,̂ fe,.2, where each 
key distribution has the same size as that of the conference key distribution. The 
channel information of a pair of users C/Q,, and Uî f, for the general case including 
eavesdropping is given by 
1 m 
= P { K V J K U , , . ) \ O G , P { K U J K U , , X (5-22) 
where the conditional probability of Kui t given by Kuq̂ , is 
1 m 
m 
m 
= (5.23) 
1=1 
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where ku. ^ = Ki ® fc/ ® A'j and ¿'(5, /) is a function of 5, i, and /. If there 
are no eavesdroppers and all measurements are perfect, 
1 (5 = i, for all i.j.) 
nKu,,Kv„.)=\ (5.24) 
1 0 / i) 
Channel information for type S2 
Equation (5.22) can been used to calculate the average channel information for 
configurations F2 and S2, 
If, = E I{Ku,; Kuo). (5.25) 
However, for the series configuration, type S2, the conference key transition prob-
ability matrix between Uq and UI must be given. For any two users, say UI and 
Uj, the transition matrix is 
= (5.26) 
where s, t = 1,2,3, • • •, m. Thus the conference key transition probability matrix 
between Uq and UI is expressed as 
Quo,Ui = Quo,UiQUi,U2-QUi.i,Ui' (5.27) 
Equation (5.22) can also be used for the channel information for type 
An advantage of systems of F2 and S2 is that the information is not a decreasing 
function in the number of users, N. This is because, for F2 and 52, the quantum 
key distribution is established between each pair of users, but not among all users. 
Considering eavesdropping, the average channel information for F2 and S2 can 
be written as: 
I Ne 
Ijr, = ^TT—r[(iV ^Ne-1) \og2 m + Yl ^UoU,] (5.28) 
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and 
I NE 
= l^r-tK^ -^E- + luoU,] (5 .29) 'E /=1 N - 1 
respectively. In (5.29) we have assumed the first Ne channels are attacked. It 
can be shown that /FJ > /^J, if - 1 > Ne > 0. 
5.3 CORRELATIONS IN QUANTUM CRYPTOSYSTEMS 
5.3.1 Correlation in Quantum Channels 
Channel information can be used to examine the resistance of a conference cryp-
tographic system against eavesdropping, as shown previously. However, we find 
that in some special circumstances the system channel information cannot reflect 
the correlation between mecisurements (which might cause a failure in describing 
a channel which is under an eavesdropping attack and has a perfect negative cor-
relation). As an example of the failure, see figure 5.5, A sends binary 0 or 1 to 
B who then obtains 0 or 1 with probability either P = 0 or P = 1. There are 
two completely different cases: in figure 5.5 (a), B receives a totally wrong signal; 
in figure 5.5 (b), B receives the correct signal. It is easy to calculate that the 
A A 
channel information, for both cases, has the same value, I(B;A) = 1. Although 
these cases are very rare, we consider another way to estimate the merit of the 
cryptosystem by using correlation function between users. 
For two users, A and B, the correlation function of A and B is defined by 
where random variables X^ and Xg are 0 when "0" is measured and 1 when "1" 
A * 
is measured. A is the measuring operator used by A and B is the measuring 
operator used by B. If the communication is perfect, C{A,B) = 1, and A and 
A A 
B are then said to be perfectly correlated. If C(A, B) = 0, then A and B are 
76 CHAPTER 5 QUANTUM CONFERENCE KEY DISTRIBUTION SYSTEMS 
(a) 
(b) 
p=o 
Figure 5 .5 A communication between A and B using only two photon pulses "0" and 
"1". (a) shows that B has a probability of zero of receiving the correct signal and a 
probability of one of receiving an incorrect signal, (b) shows that B has a probability 
of one of obtaining the correct signal and a probability of zero of receiving an incorrect 
signal. 
uncorrelated. When the communication between A and B completely fails, we 
A A 
have C{A^B) = 0. The value of the correlation function being between 0 and 
1 suggests that the results of the measurements are positively correlated. If the 
A A 
sent and received signals are negatively-correlated, then — 1 < C{A^B) < 0. In 
A A 
the cases illustrated in figure 5.5, we have C{A^B) = 1 and —1, respectively. 
If there is no any intruder between A and whether B receives a correct message 
depends only on whether B uses the correct basis relative to A's. It is easy to 
A A 
calculated that, under condition ("i, C{A,B\CI) = 1/2, and under condition 
C{Â,È\C2) = 1- If there is unique intruder E eavesdropping between A and B^ 
we find C(i,J5|Ci) = 1/4 and C(i,^|C2) = 1/2. These values suggest that the 
eavesdropping decreases the correlation of the measurement. 
Next, we consider multiuser cases. Assume that UQ is the chair of a conference and 
is in charge of the conference key communication, then the average correlation 
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for N users is 
1 coriXa^,XoJ 
N-ltl^^riXaJvariXa^W/^' ^̂  ̂  
A 
where Ui denotes an operator used by another user f/,. This formula can be 
applied to both types Fi and ^i. It is easy to show that when eavesdropping is 
absent, € hcis the same value as in the two-user Ccise. 
In the presence of eavesdropping, for type Fi, if each branch of the quantum 
channel has at most one eavesdropper, we have 
^=^ - ^r 
where Ne is the number of eavesdroppers. We found that 0.5 < C < 1. Here we 
have used the condition 
For type 5i, the series configuration, we have introduced a transition probability 
matrix, (5.16) and obtained the joint probability, (5.17). The average correlation 
can be obtained in terms of the transition probability matrix, using (5.31). 
If there are N users and Ne eavesdroppers who attack the quantum channels 
of the first Ne pairs of users, then using (5.20) and condition (2 we obtain the 
average correlation for type Si as 
If the intruder attacks the quantum channel between [fo and Ui only, C = 1/2. 
5.3.2 Correlation in Combined Channels 
Similarly to the case studied previously, private keys have to be established be-
tween each pair of users, for both configurations F2 and S2, via quantum channels, 
in order for the later use in establishing the conference key. To calculate the cor-
relation between the sent and received conference key distribution, we first define 
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a transition matrix between Ui and i/j, 
Q{Ui, Ui) = { P ( K u , , , . (5 .34) 
The joint probability of Ui and Uj is 
P{Ku,,, Kv,.) = P(Kv,,. )P{Ku,,\Ku,.). (5 .35) 
Note that {Kui t} has m states and Kui t a-nd Kuj» represents the same conference 
key for any i and = 1,2,..., m. 
We also need to introduce two random variables, Xui and Xuj-, taking values 
Xuo = 5, if Kuq̂ ^ is sent, 
Xui = 5 , if Kui , is received, 
where 5 = 1,2, ...,m. 
Hence the correlation between the information received by Uq and Ui can be 
obtained in terms of the formula: 
r i Y Y cov(Xu^,Xu,) 
G(Xuo,^Ui) = Tv"! /V \n/2' 
The system correlation is defined as the average correlation over cJl users, and is 
the same as (5.31). 
5.4 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
More general quantum conference key distribution systems can be established in 
terms of the basic structures studied in previous sections. The most straight-
forward model is a ring-configuration, as shown in figure 5.6 (a), which can be 
compared to the series configurations. Our analysis for series configurations is 
applicable to a ring-configuration. In figure 5.6 (b), a configuration based on a 
combination of series configurations is shown. Each branch can be treated as a 
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(a) (b) 
Figure 5.6 Quantum conference key systems based on fan-shaped and series config-
urations. The unshaded circle in each diagram represents the chair. 
group as has been discussed in previous sections. The final conference key com-
munication in such a system can be carried out utilizing boolean addition and a 
clcLSsical channel, figure 5.6 (c) exhibits a tree configuration, which is bcised on 
either Fi or F2. 
The number of users in each group seems important for types FI and S\, since as 
mentioned previously, the channel information is a decreasing function of N. In 
order to increcise the information rate with a large number of user, UQ has to in-
crease the size of the information string, this, we believe, will cost communication 
time. A reasonable N should be chosen considering the physical requirements for 
a practical system. 
The conference key (figure 5.6) is sent to each group by the chair using classical 
channels and Boolean addition. In the absence of eavesdropping, each group has 
a group key. The correlation and information of the channels between the groups 
can be calculated in terms of the method introduced in the previous sections, 
provided we treat each group as a single user. However, in the presence of eaves-
dropping, some group key distributions might have been badly hurt, hence the 
calculation becomes complicated. Under such a situation, the calculation has to 
rely on users' keys and relevant quantum channels because the case is different 
from user to user. The security of a conference key distribution is based on each 
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group key distribution, where since the establishment of group key distributions 
involves quantum channels, any attack(s) can be detected before the final confer-
ence key distribution is sent by the chair. Consequently, a secure conference key 
distribution can be established, once all eavesdroppers are removed. 
In our study, we have ignored noise which might cause errors and thus is an 
important factor in our conference key protocols. The problem seems quite serious 
for configurations Fi and Si, since they require an identical signal for each of their 
mecisurements. However we would suggest that hashing technique might be an 
efficient method to resolve this problem, as it has been successfully demonstrated 
in the BB protocol [6]. In contrast, the noise problem for configurations F2 and S2 
is smaller, simply because the conference key is dependent only on the individual 
quantum channel which can have very small error rates according to the BB 
protocol experiment [6]. 
In conclusion, in this chapter we have investigated quantum conference key dis-
tribution protocols. The channel information and correlation between users have 
been studied to demonstrate the merit of our systems against eavesdropping. 
However, there are some issues on proposed protocols to be pointed out. (1) We 
have showed that configurations Fi and Si have a disadvantage in the restriction 
of the user population. Fi suffers potential failure under grouped attacks. Si is 
inefficient when the number of users is large. (2) Configurations F2 and S2 are 
more secure than Fi and Si. This is because each pair of legitimate users use 
different quantum bits to transmit their signal. However, since the conference 
key is transmitted via a classical channel, it is not "quantized". 
Despite these problems on the protocols proposed in this chapter. The valuable 
thing is that the work provides an overview of conference key protocols based on 
quantum mechanics. 
6 
EAVESDROPPING BY QUANTUM 
NONDEMOLITION DETECTION 
An ordinary optical measurement inevitably damages the signal after the mea-
surement, due to the introduction of quantum noise. However, there is a measure-
ment scheme which does not add any quantum noise to the signal and conserves 
the physical features of the signal. Thus the original signal is maintained after 
the measurement. The method is called quantum nondemolition detection (QND). 
The aim of the QND is to measure an observable of a system, without the act 
of measurement disturbing the evolution of the observable at later times. The 
general theory of QND measurement was developed by Caves et al, [35]. A good 
interpretation of QND measurement was presented by Braginsky, Vorontsov, and 
Thorne [36]. A number of QND measurement schemes have been proposed. An 
experimental demonstration of a QND measurement has been done by Levenson, 
Shelby, Reid, and Walls [37] using four-wave mixing in optical fibres. 
In principle, QND schemes could be used in quantum cryptography for both 
eavesdropping and multiuser cryptographic systems. However, we wish to know 
how well they will perform. The only work published involving QND mecisure-
ment in quantum cryptography was presented by Werner and Milburn [19], where 
they established a theoretical model of eavesdropping for an EPR type of cryp-
tographic system, but obtained a negative outcome. 
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In this chapter, we will explore applications of QND mecisurement to two crypto-
graphic systems. First, we investigate a QND attack on a interferometric system 
outlined by Bennett [10]. Second, we study the system using an optical coupler 
as presented in Chapter 3. 
6.1 BENNETT'S TWO-STATE SYSTEM AND 
EAVESDROPPING BY QUANTUM NONDEMOLITION 
DETECTION 
Secure key distributions can be generated using optical wave interaction. A good 
example WCLS given by Bennett [10] who predicted the usefulness of the optical 
interferometric system to realize secure key distribution using two nonorthogonal 
quantum states. The measurement in his protocol is based on two non-commuting 
projection operators. One property of these operators is that if a wrong operator 
is used, we will obtain a zero eigenvalue, but not the random value we expect 
to obtain. In this section, we introduce Bennett's method and investigate an 
eavesdropping strategy using a QND scheme. Our intention is to examine whether 
the proposed QND mecisurement can eavesdrop coherent cryptographic signal 
without being noticed. 
6.1.1 Brief review of the protocol utilizing optical interferometry 
In 1992, Bennett proposed a quantum cryptographic protocol using two nonorthog-
onal states. He chose two nonorthogonal states, |iio) and |iii), and two non-
commuting projection operators, PQ = I — |ui)(wi| and Pi = 1 — Po 
annihilates |ui), but yields positive results when applied to |wo), and vice versa 
for Pi. 
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Alice's half-lnterformeter Bob's half-interformeter 
Detector 
W-gwg» 
W- Ì» 
W j»'-
Figure 6.1 Bennett's model of interferometric quantum key distribution using two 
nonorthogonal coherent states. The source on the left supplies coherent pulses (wave 
form W) of intensity greater than one to Alice's half-interferometer, where asymmetric 
beam splitters, mirrors, and a phase shifter (PSA =0® or 180®) produce a dim signal 
pulse (w or, phase shifted, m), followed by a bright reference pulse W. After being sent 
to Bob through a single mode optical fiber, the pulses enter Bob's half-interferometer, 
where, depending on whether the sum of Alice and Bob's phase shifts is 0® or 180®, the 
signal pulse undergoes constructive (wave form 2w) or destructive (wave form nothing) 
interference with attenuated reference pulse before entering the detector. Arriving after 
the interference pulse is a bright, twice-delayed, reference pulse (wave form W) which 
Bob monitors to be certain the reference pulses are not being suppressed. Also not shown 
are two unused beams leaving the rightmost beam splitter of each half-interferometer 
in a downward direction. 
A practical realization of those measurements was predicted applying two half-
interferometers shown in figure 6.1. Beginning at the left of the figure, Alice uses 
two asymmetric beam splitters to split an initial coherent light into two pulses 
separated in time: a dim pulse of intensity less than one is followed by a bright 
reference pulse of intensity greater than one. The dim pulse is the signal pulse 
whose phase is shifted either 0® or 180® by a phase shift PSA and then delivered 
to a single mode optical fibre in the interferometer. The phase of the brighter 
pulse is not shifted, but is delayed by a fixed time At. At the receiving end 
of the apparatus. Bob uses a half-interferometer, similar to Alice's, to split the 
incoming beams into a dim part and a bright part, in the same ratio CLS before. 
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As before the dim part is phase shifted (PSB) by 0® and 180®, while the bright 
part is delayed by At. The PSB is independent of Alice's phase shifts. Finally, 
the two parts are made to interfere as they enter a detector. 
The wave entering the detector consists of three pulses separated by time At. 
The first pulse, a very dim pulse which hcis been attenuated both by Bob and 
by Alice but delayed by neither, is not considered further. The second pulse, 
containing important information, is a dim pulse consisting of the superposition 
of the beam delayed by Alice and attenuated by Bob, and the beam delayed by 
Bob and attenuated by Alice. Finally, after a delay At in the superposed pulse, 
a bright pulse, which hcis been delayed by both Alice and Bob but attenuated by 
neither, will arrive at Bob's detector. 
The key distribution can be easily established in such a way that, for example, 
Alice rcindomly sends red or green flcishes (corresponding to 0® and 180®) of 
intensity less than one, and Bob would publicly report any flashes he saw (but 
not their colours). A secret key distribution can be constituted, depending on 
the colours. 
Taking into consideration that two non-commuting measuring operators, Po and 
Pi, are used, the system can be protected against Eve who has a similar appa-
ratus but with her own phase shifter. If Eve uses Po all green flashes will be 
annihilated and if Eve uses Pi all red flashes will be annihilated. This will result 
in approximate half of flashes being empty states. It is not possible to distinguish 
whether these empty states come from Eve's measurement or the original signal, 
hence it is not possible for Eve to resend (to substitute for the signal using her 
fake signal) without causing substantial changes in the signal. 
However, because ordinary coherent states with phase shifted at either 0® or 180® 
are used in the system, it is possible for Eve to use either a projection operator 
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F i g u r e 6 . 2 A schematic diagram of Q N D measurement 
or some other method of detection (for example, a homodyne detection, if the 
phcLse reference has been ascertained), The detector can be set to suit 0® states for 
instance, hence all 0° states CAN be identified. Once Eve finds an empty pulse 
(no projection), she may guess that the bit is the 180® state. However if Alice's 
signal contains many empty pulses, Eve will not be able to know whether the zero 
represent the 180® state or an empty pulse. This is a basic criterion of the protocol. 
Nevertheless, this criterion implies some sort of certainty which is true only when 
the two coherent states are either NOISELESS or ORTHOGONAL. In other 
words, they do not have any overlap. However this cissumption is false according 
to Bennett's basic nonorthogonal condition which is essential for security. The 
basic method for Bennett to get rid of the contradiction is that the phase of each 
useful dim pulse is associated to a bright phase reference pulse. Hence, although 
we still have the suspicion of projection uncertainty due to the overlap between 
each pairs of dim states, we presume that Bennett's projection operators are 
correct. 
In the following analysis, we accordingly use two projection operators and ignore 
the issues arising from the overlap in Bennett's system. 
Basic mechanism of QND measurement 
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Figure 6.2 explains how a QND measurement works, where A represents a signal 
operator and B represents a probe operator which will be mecisured by a detec-
tor. The incident signal A(io) will not be damaged after the QND measurement 
process is completed. The theory of QND measurement hcis been described in 
detail by Caves et a/. [35]. To understand the bcisic mechanism of QND mea-
surement, we briefly review the work by Caves et al.. Consider an observable a, 
with the corresponding operator A{t) in a Schrodinger picture. If in a sequence 
of measurements of a, the results of each measurement can be predicted precisely, 
a is then called QND observable. This can be expressed zis 
Ait) = f(A{to),t,to), (6.1) 
where / is a arbitrary function corresponding to the QND measurement, to is the 
initial time and t is the time after an evolution (or a QND measurement) and 
A(t) is the output signal. In an interaction picture, above the equation can be 
written as 
[A / ( i ) ,A / (M]=0 , (6.2) 
where labels the interaction picture. This means that Ai{t) and Ai{to) have 
common results in a measurement. 
6.1.2 QND attack using parametric frequency conversion 
Our model of a QND attack is based on a parametric frequency converter [23] and 
quantum physics. Assume that the signal mode is represented by a (at) which 
is the annihilation (creation) operator of the field; similarly, the probe mode is 
represented by p (pt). The Hamiltonian for this system is given by 
H = fiujaa^ + hLjpp^ -f -f- c.c.), (6.3) 
where c.c. denotes a complex conjugate, /c denotes coupling constant, and we 
have assumed that the damping of both the signal and probe fields is small and 
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negligible. In an interaction picture, the Hamiltonian can be simplified to 
H I = + C.C.). (6 .4) 
The Heisenberg equations of motion in the interaction picture are 
da 
— = - I K P , (6.5) 
dp 
— = - m a , (6.6) 
here, a = aexpiiujJ) and p = pex^{iu}pt). The solution is 
a = a(0) cos Kt — ¿p(0) sin nt, (6 .7) 
p = p(0) cos Kt — ia(0) sin Kt. (6.8) 
where t is interaction time. 
Now we consider Bennett's model. Before proceeding, it is necessary to assume 
that the weak pulse contains real key information and hence to ignore bright 
pulses which are for phase reference. This is because the changes (due to the 
QND interaction) in phase and in the intensity of the bright pulses are negligible 
(this condition holds if Kt is close to 2kT, A; = 0,1,2, • • •). 
We must design a QND attack which conserves the signal phase. The best way 
to realize this goal in a present system is to set the probe field be a vacuum 
state. This, in terms of the above solution, leads to conservation of the phase, 
i.e., e{t) = e(o). 
After a QND interaction, the signal amplitude (< 1 on the average) is reduced by 
a factor of cos Kt with respect to K and t. This reduction can be made as small as 
possible by choosing a suitable interaction interval t. However this choice should 
also made with respect to the sensitivity of the measurement on the probe output. 
In order to avoid attenuation in the signal, i.e., |a| = |a(0)|, it may be necessary 
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to use a non-vacuum state for the probe mode, say a coherent state. However, 
because of the probe field 6(0), conservation of the pheise no longer exists. This 
is easily to be found from (6.7) 
fl(i) = «(0) + i[a(0),p(0),/c,<]. (6.9) 
The difficulty here is that i is a function subject to the signal field, but also de-
pendent on Eve's parameters. This makes it impossible for Eve to use a constant 
phase shifter to adjust the phase change in the QND interaction. 
In order to be consistent to the coding strategy and the noise feature of the QND, 
we further analyze the light field utilizing quadrature phase amplitudes. 
«i(<) = ^ ¿ - ( a e ' ^ - ' + ate-"« ' ) , (6.10) 
Mt) = - (6-") 
Pi(<) = (6-12) 
with 
ai,a2] = ih/uja, \PuP2] = ih/ojp, (6.14) 
where ai,a2 {P11P2) are actually operators corresponding to the real and imagi-
nary components of the signal (probe) mode. 
Using solutions (6.7) and (6.8), we have 
ai{t) = ai{0) cos Kt + ^J(JJp/ufaP2(0) sin Kt, (6.15) 
a2{t) = 02(0) cos Kt - yJup/uJaPliO) SlU Kt, (6.16) 
Plit) = Pi(0) COS Kt + yJuJal(jJpa2{^) sin /ci, (6.17) 
P2{t) - P2(0) COS Kt - y^WaA^ai(O) sin Kt, (6.18) 
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If the probe field is a vacuum state and the signal field is encoded only in the 
X axis (in accordance with Bennett's signal arrangement), the solution under 
averaging is 
(ai(i)> = ±|{ai(0)>|cos/c^, (6.19) 
(a2(0) = 0, (6.20) 
{piit)) = 0, (6.21) 
{P2{t)) = ± ^ / C ^ | ( a i ( 0 ) ) | s i n / c t , (6.22) 
where and " correspond to 0® and 180® respectively. Determining (p2(0) 
actually leads to the determination of the signal {ai(i)). In fact, it is not hard to 
find 
ai{t) = y/ujp/(jja\p2{0)/ sin Kt — p2(t) cos /c<], (6.23) 
The noise induced by the QND device is 
(AaJ(i)) = (AaJ(O)) cos^ Kt + "^{ApKO)) sin^ KL (6.24) 
If the probe mode is a squeezed state, (Apji^)) = ^ 
Hence the QND mecisurement does not add any noise to the signal. 
If Eve uses a measuring apparatus similar to Bob's and uses one projection op-
erator only, she can accurately detect half the string of mode p. The remaining 
results must be zero belonging to the mixture of vacuum states and the other half 
of the signal string. It is impossible for Eve to amplify these attenuated signal 
modes, due to the lack of coding information of the signal. If the attenuation is 
negligible, Eve's attack is partly successful. This means that the eavesdropping 
may not be revealed. However, since a large fraction of the information on the 
key is still unknown to Eve, the eavesdropping eventually fails. 
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6.2 THE QND ATTACK ON THE PROTOCOL USING AN 
OPTICAL COUPLER 
We now apply the same QND scheme to our system studied in Chapter 3, i.e., the 
system based on an optical coupler. The system differs from Bennett's system in 
that the encoding relies on four nonorthogoncd states based on both quadrature 
phase amplitudes. Since these states overlap each other, Eve cannot identify them 
by using any projection operators. 
We assume that probe light is a vacuum state, then the solution of the Heisenberg 
equations of motion in the interaction picture is 
ai{t) = ai(0)cos/ci, (6.25) 
a2{t) = 02(0) cos/ci, (6.26) 
Pi(t) = sin /ci, (6.27) 
= \A^o/'^pai(0)sin/ct. (6.28) 
The obvious difference from the previous section (6.1) is that the quadrature 
components for the signal field and the probe field both have to be considered, 
because the signal is encoded using all possible codings a = {ai, —ai,ia2, —¿«2}-
In the last section, we found that for a vacuum probe field the signal phase is 
perfectly preserved, except for the attenuation of the light power. The situation 
in the current system is similar. The difference is that although Eve can extract 
the signed, there is no any method available for her to detect four nonorthogonal 
states overlapped each other. We can now conclude that our model is more secure 
against a QND attack. 
In sunmiary, it is possible for us to build a QND apparatus which can extract 
information from the signal and maintcdn the signal phase. For Bennett's sys-
tem, Eve could obtain some information about the key, but the signal sent by 
C H A P T E R 6 EAVESDROPPING BY QUANTUM NONDEMOLITION DETECTION 9 1 
Alice must suffer attenuation subject to the QND measurement. However the 
information obtained by Eve may not be useful, since Eve is still unable to de-
termine a large fraction of information on the key. In our system based on four 
nonorthogonal states, Eve can also extract the signal, but it is much harder for 
her to obtain encoding information. We should point out that even though the 
QND measurement does not introduce noise and conserves signal phase, quantum 
measurements on probe states also are subject to the uncertainty principle. This 
suggests that quantum cryptography is secure against QND attacks. 
7 
CONCLUSION 
We have investigated some cryptographic protocols which are based on either the 
uncertainty principle or Bell's theorem. The focus of these protocols has been 
on applying quantum principles to computer security in cases unamenable to 
conventional methods. The protocols we have studied are summarized as follows: 
We have presented a quantum cryptographic system based on an optical coupler 
and modeled by using four nonorthogonal light fields which have been analyzed 
using quantized quadrature phase amplitudes. This is the first demonstration of 
the usefulness of quadrature phfise amplitudes and the optical coupler to quantum 
cryptography. Our system has high security against eavesdropping in that the 
four encoding states are almost indistinguishable - more than 90% superposition, 
in comparison with the BB protocol which has an inner product value of 0.707 
for two nonorthogonal polarized encoding states. 
For the case of Bell's theorem, we have undertaken calculations for both photon-
based and spin-~particle-based systems to study Ekert's protocol. Agreeing with 
Ekert's result, our calculation demonstrates that eavesdropping leads to no vio-
lation of Bell's inequality. 
We have investigated quantum conference key protocols. We used information 
theory to demonstrate the merit of our systems against eavesdropping. The se-
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curity in these systems is guManteed by cryptographic communication in each 
quantum channel, where any eavesdropping can be detected. Despite some short-
comings on the protocols, our work provides a useful overview on quantum con-
ference key protocols. 
We have demonstrated that it is possible for us to build a QND apparatus that 
can extract some information from the signal in Bennett's two-state system, but 
it is impossible to obtain sufficient information on the key. Therefore the QND 
attack fails. On the other hand, we have demonstrated that the QND attack 
cannot break our system. Our research suggests that all QND schemes encounter 
a similar difficulty in quantum cryptographic systems. Although it is possible for 
a QND measurement to maintain signal encoding, we cannot say it is useful since 
detection on the probe light cannot yield any useful outcome. 
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